W. L. T. LIBRARY

THE ARYAN PATH

VOLUME XXXV · NO. 4

April 1964

NAMRATĀ
The Realism of Spiritual Ethics

ROY WALKER
"Who Deciphers Them?"
Shakespeare's Four Hundredth Anniversary

BHIKSHU SANGHARAKSHITA
The Stages of the Path in Buddhism: I

EDWARD THORNTON
Jungian Psychology and the Vedanta

ROBERT POWELL
Knowledge and Language

BOOKS REVIEWED INCLUDE

Edward Myers's *Education in the Perspective of History*; H. H. Shri-Jaya-Chamaraja Wadiyar's *The Gītā and Indian Culture*; *Lexicographical Studies in Jaina Sanskrit*; *Tolerance: A Study from Buddhist Sources*; A. J. Arberry's translation, *More Tales from the Masnavi* of Rumi; *The Liberal Mind*; *Music in the Life of Man*; *Sanskrit Poetics as a Study of Aesthetic*

complete CONTENTS within

Point out the 'Way'
however dimly and lost among the host —
as does the Evening Star
to those who tread their path in darkness.

Editor:
SOPHIA WADIA

AT YOUR SERVICE

I keep six honest serving men
(They taught me all I know):
Their names are WHAT *and* WHY *and* WHEN
And HOW *and* WHERE *and* WHO.

— KIPLING

WHAT

THIS PROMINENT PAGE is at your service. We offer it as advertising space,

in addition to the back cover and page,

for

anything that is to be brought to the notice of a readers' circle spread through India, Europe, and America, a circle of thoughtful people, interested in things of the mind and in products of other cultures as well as their own.

WHY

Because THE ARYAN PATH is in touch with such friends for over thirty years.

WHEN

Each month till the 10th for the next month's issue.

HOW

For single insertion or by periodical contract.

WHERE and WHO

Please write to the Editor at the Bombay Office.

The rates are	Single Insertion			Periodical Contract
	Full	Half	Quarter	
Outside back cover	Rs. 250	Rs. 150	Please inquire	
Inside back cover	Rs. 150	Rs. 80	Please inquire	
Inside front cover (this page)	Rs. 200	Rs. 125	Please inquire	
Page	Rs. 125	Rs. 75	Rs. 40	Please inquire

THE ARYAN PATH

Editor: SOPHIA WADIA
Assistant Editor: Rameshchandra Sirkar

CONTRIBUTIONS

The Editor is responsible for unsigned contributions only and is not necessarily in agreement with the views of the contributors, to whom free expression of opinion is given

SUBSCRIPTIONS

THE ARYAN PATH is published monthly. Subscriptions are annual, but may begin with any desired month. Orders, accompanied by the appropriate remittance, should be sent to the Editorial and Business Office, Bombay, or the London Office

RATES

	Single Copy	Annual Subscription
INDIA	Re. 1.25	Rs. 12.00
EUROPE	1*s.* 9*d.*	18*s.* (or equivalent)
THE AMERICAS	50 cents	$5.00 (or equivalent)

OFFICES

EDITORIAL & BUSINESS OFFICE	Theosophy Hall, 40 New Marine Lines Bombay 1
LONDON OFFICE	62 Queen's Gardens, London W. 2

Available in the U.S.A. from Eastern News Distributors 255 Seventh Avenue, New York 1, N.Y.

THE ARYAN PATH: VOL. XXXV · NO. 4

April 1964

NAMRATĀ	The Realism of Spiritual Ethics	145
ROY WALKER	"Who Deciphers Them?": Shakespeare's Four Hundredth Anniversary	148
BHIKSHU SANGHARAKSHITA	The Stages of Path in Buddhism: I	154
EDWARD THORNTON	Jungian Psychology and the Vedanta	159
ROBERT POWELL	Knowledge and Language	164
DILIP KUMAR SEN	Canadian Poetry in English	167
RAMESH CHANDRA SHAH	The Fallacy of First Impressions	172
SUJATA PRIYAMBADA	Go on Wandering (Poem)	176
HERBERT BLUEN	The Dreamer's Eye (Poem)	190

NEW BOOKS AND OLD

P. B. MUKHARJI — A Study of Educational History — 177

and reviews by

K. GURU DUTT, H. G. NARAHARI, B. CH. CHABRA, E. V. HAYES, ROSHAN KOTHAWALA, W. MONTGOMERY WATT, L. DELGADO, KENNETH WALKER, EDWARD THORNTON, K. KRISHNAMOORTHY, K. R. SRINIVASA IYENGAR, CZESLAW RAYMUND HALSKI, D. GURUMURTI, B. G. RAMACHANDRA RAO, DILIP KUMAR SEN AND HILLA C. VAKEEL — 178

BALDOON DHINGRA — Leaves from a Paris Diary — 188

ENDS AND SAYINGS — 191

THE ARYAN PATH

Point out the "Way" — however dimly, and
lost among the host — as does the evening star
to those who tread their path in darkness.

— *The Voice of the Silence*

VOL. XXXV APRIL 1964 No. 4

THE REALISM OF SPIRITUAL ETHICS

MEDITATION, abstinence in all, the observation of moral duties, gentle thoughts, good deeds and kind words, as good will to all and entire oblivion of self, are the most efficacious means of obtaining knowledge and preparing for the reception of higher wisdom.

—*Raja-Yoga or Occultism*

MODERN PSYCHOLOGY is a product of our contemporary civilization. Its roots are implanted in the shallow and arid soil of materialism. It lacks a spiritual tradition and does not go beyond the psychic realm. Ancient Oriental psychology has behind it a long spiritual tradition and its roots are embedded in the realm of the Spirit.

This fundamental difference makes for diametrically opposite approaches to the many psychological problems we are facing today on all sides. There is an increasing unrest and a sense of frustration; considerable nervous tension and anxiety. The modern psychologist claims he is trying to restore mental health. His goal is the well-being and happiness of his patient. That is also the goal of the practitioner of spiritual meditation. But that is the only common factor. In all else there is a wide gulf between the modern psycho-therapist and the advocate of spiritual therapy. The definition of mental health itself is altogether different, since the concept of man is poles apart. For the modern psychologist man is at best a social animal. For the ancient spiritual therapist he is primarily an unfolding Soul, potentially divine.

The modern approach aims at helping the mentally disturbed to adapt themselves to the prevailing conditions, by accepting them as unavoidable and even necessary, and hence to conform to them. The spiritual approach, on the other hand, begins by suggesting a re-evaluation of these conditions and advocating the cultivation of some degree of detachment. If such a re-thinking on a dispassionate basis reveals the evil of the world's behaviour, there should be no compromise and no conforming.

The fundamental difference between these two approaches is vividly apparent in the attitude to sex and sex life. The so-called "new morality" starts from the assumption that, because the sex urge is natural, sexual self-indulgence is not only permissible, but even desirable. Pre-marital and extra-marital relations are considered legitimate; promiscuity and even sexual aberrations are condoned. The conflict arises, argue the advocates of this new school, because of a false sense of guilt rooted in obsolete moral taboos. Teach the young people to get rid of this sense of guilt and they will enjoy sex relationships freely without any psychological disturbance.

This, from the standpoint of spiritual psychology, is an abomination inspired by Māra.[1] It merely brings man to accept as normal his own degradation. It reduces him to the level of an animal. The moral conscience has been dulled and the mind closed to any higher influence. The spiritual tradition considers such "adaptation" as a horrible downfall. Vice cannot be overcome by indulgence. "It is by feeding vice that it expands and waxes strong, like to the worm that fattens on the blossom's heart."

Instead of advocating indulgence, as does the "progressive morality," ancient psychology teaches self-restraint, accompanied by the practice of meditation. Man is an animal plus a living God! He stands between the animal nature and the higher reason and spiritual consciousness. This duality makes of man a mixture of good and evil. The Soul is drawn to the Self of Spirit and pulled down by the self of Matter. And so man at times is moved by spiritual aspirations, by higher volitions, by divine love. At other times he is motivated by selfish desires, animal passions, and hatred. This is the fierce conflict which rages within the human mind and which must be resolved not by submission to the lower propensities, not by becoming a slave to the animal nature, but by liberating the mind from all that is of the earth, earthy, by raising it above the animal and making it the channel for the God to act through.

Spiritual psychology helps man to gain control over his lower nature and to unfold his inherent divinity. It teaches a reformation of the conduct of life which will restore the inner balance and mental health.

Such a spiritual discipline advocates a life of virtue. It includes both ethics and philosophy, and teaches the practice of mindfulness and concentration. Then follow exercises of meditation leading to wisdom. A mind wedded to passion, imprisoned by lust, anger, and greed, is totally blind to anything but the gross world of matter. The liberated mind becomes receptive to higher vibrations and enters a realm beyond that of external and transitory phenomena.

---

[1] The personification of evil that smothers the soul, in Buddhist mythology.

There can be no reconciliation between these two approaches. "The learned and the ignorant cannot agree on the subjects of Spirit, Matter, World, just as a sober man cannot agree with a drunken man," says Vasiṣṭha, the great Indian Sage, the preceptor of Rāma. Every effort must be made to help the drunken man to get over his drunkenness and to wish to remain sober. Instead, the "new morality" — which should be called the "new immorality" — aims at bringing him to accept his drunkenness, to cease to resist it, and to reconcile himself to a chronic state of intoxication! Chronic drunkenness is injurious to both body and mind. Under its influence man is led to abject crime and vice. There is no possible justification for such an insane and abnormal condition.

In a recent talk in London Dr. Paul Campbell of Canada is reported to have said:

> If lungs are misused by absorbing nicotine, there is eight times the likelihood of cancer. If livers are used to screen the poisonous effects of alcohol, they harden, lose their function and lead to death. If sex is used for self-indulgence rather than procreation the energy of the individual and of the race is reduced.

What then is the remedy? The only remedy lies in the release of the mind. To quote again the ancient sage Vasiṣṭha: "Release the Elephant — your mind — from the fetters of its egoism and its bonds of avarice."

The release of the mind brings about its transformation, whereby the very quality and mode of thinking change altogether. The unreleased mind is the passionate mind, *Kāma-Manas,* the released mind becomes the *upādhi* or vehicle of divine intuition and the channel of the Spiritual will. *Kāma-Manas* has become transformed into *Buddhi-Manas.* The animal man has become the divine man, the man of mind complete.

The Higher Mind, *Buddhi-Manas,* is potentially in every man and this is the true basis for the sentiment that all men are created equal. The equality lies in the inherent potentiality. Man must be made aware of this potential divinity.

In the *Surangama* it is stated:

> The human mind possesses the Buddha-nature unobtainable from others. It can be compared to a man who has a jewel in his clothes he knows not of, or to a man who seeks after food when he has a treasure in his own storehouse.

The Great Ones all teach us to seek that hidden jewel, to find the way to the storehouse within wherein that treasure awaits us. They tell us of a triple way, a way of Precept, Meditation, and Wisdom. May we follow that Triple Way and thus discover the Buddha-Mind in us!

NAMRATĀ

"WHO DECIPHERS THEM?"

SHAKESPEARE'S FOUR HUNDREDTH ANNIVERSARY

[THE ARYAN PATH will happily and humbly take its share in the world-wide celebrations this year to mark the four hundredth anniversary of the birth of William Shakespeare. We propose to publish, beginning with this the actual month of the anniversary, a series of articles on Shakespeare. We are happy to have for the first this subtle piece of Shakespearean thinking by **Mr. Roy Walker**. Mr. Walker is distinguished as writer, critic, lecturer, and occasional broadcaster. But his final interest is in drama, and in Shakespeare and poetic drama in particular. His books on *Hamlet* and *Macbeth* have been highly praised. He is on the Professorial Panel of the University of London, and also lectures on Shakespeare and Modern Drama for Oxford, Cambridge, and other English universities.—ED.]

ON 23 APRIL England, and a fair part of the wider world, celebrates the four hundredth anniversary of the birth of William Shakespeare. Sir Laurence Olivier will make his first appearance as Othello, at the new National Theatre of which he is Director. Stratford-upon-Avon will launch a marathon series of the Histories the like of which has not been seen on the stage for half a century. The Royal Shakespeare Company is touring Europe with notable productions of *King Lear* and *The Comedy of Errors*. The British Council has dispatched lecturers on Shakespeare to a score of countries. There is to be a mammoth Shakespeare Exhibition. The poet's is to be the first non-royal head to appear on English postage stamps.

Amidst all these more or less obligatory celebrations — with which many people may become so glutted that their love of Shakespeare will surfeit and so die (for a few seasons anyway) — where is the man whose birth we are supposed to be celebrating? Or, at least, where and what is our picture of him? The short answer would seem to be that we do not have one. Or rather there are several competitors, none with more than minority support, each generally held to be more or less incompatible with the others. The simple thought that the "myriad-minded" creator of all the characters in the First Folio might himself have been a man of many and sometimes conflicting parts does not really get us much farther. Anyway there is now a league of anti-Stratfordians — Baconians, Marloweites, Oxfordians and the rest — who maintain that this ignorant country lout could not possibly have written the plays anyway.

Others tend — no doubt we all do — to see Shakespeare as our own reflection in fancy dress. Scholars find a scholar, who seems to have thought nothing of collating a score of variant source versions in writing a single play. Psychologists find Shakespeare disclosing, if not positively dramatiz-

ing, his own Oedipus complex (though *Hamlet* is in fact an Orestes plot). Those more or less acquainted with show business see a practical business man with a shrewd eye on theatrical fashions and the box-office. But none of these views really dominates the scene. In the last century there was a mushroom growth of imaginary biography, starting from a somewhat bowdlerized interpretation of the Sonnets as revealing the poet's private life and hand-picking quotations from what people say in his plays to sustain a portrait that would not have embarrassed a Victorian Poet Laureate. Against this there was sharp reaction a generation ago, in the form of a famous essay on "the mythical sorrows of Shakespeare," which has more or less inhibited any scholar or critic with a reputation to lose from any but the most cautious and specialized speculation.

Yet it seems to me that the search should be resumed. To it all the modern approaches can contribute, but we must start by accepting that pattern-finding and evaluation may be a discipline and a skill but cannot be, in any usual sense, a science. Which is to say that the results will always be more or less disputable. We shall need the back-drop — the whole scene of civilized Western tradition and its expression in the people, conditions, and books of the Elizabethan England that was Shakespeare's living context. We shall need hindsight, though we shall need particularly to beware of the distorting lens through which a modern world and mind looks back on that of the English Renaissance. But above all we shall have to accept the totality of Shakespeare's writing in plays, poems, and sonnets as containing the best terms in which to formulate its own statement of its own significance. Ideological paraphrase is seldom better than prose paraphrase.

We must approach this total text two-dimensionally at least, simultaneously aware of "time" and "space." By "time" I mean a constant awareness of the order in which the works were written; we may say that the chronology of the plays is now fairly well established, though the dating of the Sonnets remains a battlefield. By "space" I mean the readiness to see, as Wilson Knight particularly has done, vital relationships between images, characters, and plots that may lie far apart in the twenty or so years of Shakespeare's writing life. This sort of pattern-seeking cannot be done merely with a concordance, though that is an essential tool. What may be expressed in a poetic image in one place may be expanded into a visual one, a situation, a character, or an entire plot in another. We also need a total consciousness of all elements of the drama as alternative or complementary modes of expression. I have pointed out elsewhere, for instance, that the imagery of starlight and candle in *Macbeth* must be taken with the Folio directions about the use of actual torches, which have had scant respect from most modern editors.

To give an example of what I mean by the pattern that may seem to

emerge from the total Shakespearean text I choose an instance that seems to me to point to the heart of the matter. In prose, of course, the theme is a disappointing commonplace. It is the dualist conception of the human experience that runs right through Western if not world civilization: the conception of man as both body and spirit, and of his destiny as a working out of the uneasy relations between those two elements.

What was probably Shakespeare's first comedy, *The Comedy of Errors,* is often called his worst play. It is farcical situation comedy, doubling the fun, such as it is, of the Plautine device of identical twins and mistaken identities. Is it no more than that? Then why, for instance, set it in the "frame" of a father due to die when the sun sets? Is there a theme, submerged though it may be, and probably more so to our eyes than to those of Shakespeare's more subtle contemporaries? If not, how account for the otherwise astonishingly inappropriate (because serious) lines spoken by the Duke in the finale, when the twins are face to face (as they are only when the father also has reappeared):

> One of these men is Genius to the other
> And so of these: which is the natural man
> And which the spirit? Who deciphers them?
> (v.i.334-6)

The only answer to the question is that implied in the final exit of all the characters into the religious house.

But is this Shakespeare himself? Are we reading too much into what may be a trumpery piece of sentiment at the end of a farce, like a light-hearted general moral to a fable? Turn to Shakespeare's last comedy, if not his final play, *The Tempest.* Here is another Duke, the exiled Prospero, and now there are two non-naturalistic figures, the sub-human Caliban and the spirit Ariel. It would certainly be no novelty in criticism to remark that they are, as we would now say, "projections" of spiritual and animal elements in Prospero's personality. The play moves to the point where the animal is subdued, the spirit is set free, and the man returns to the everyday world. That this is the theme of *The Tempest* is hardly to be denied.

But do we not seem to see that the author of *The Tempest* is the author of *The Comedy of Errors,* that what was tentatively raised at the end of the first comedy is full-grown in the final one? Does not this affect our experience of both plays — and does it not give us a glimpse of Shakespeare's way of experiencing life? Once the perspective is glimpsed, of course, there is no difficulty in finding other phases of the theme in the intervening plays, comedies or not (our peril, no doubt, is that we may seem to find too much). In the "three-decker" *Dream,* for instance, the

immortals and the mechanicals stand to the lovers somewhat as Ariel and Caliban stand to Prospero. In short, what is — in a quite undogmatic sense — "religious" dominates what might be called philosophical, psychological, aesthetic, or realistic in the works of Shakespeare and surely, therefore, in the poet too.

If there is any critical value in drawing attention to this perennial spirit-body conflict as central to the personality of the poet (as distinct from being central to everybody else as well) and so as a true focus in which all his work falls into one perspective, that value would emerge only in the persuasiveness, if any, of full-scale interpretation of his work. But we can, for instance, begin to see how it might work out with the ten English Histories. It is obvious that, in one sense, the right order of these plays is that of the First Folio — the order of the historical events with which they deal. But there has been great difficulty in seeing them steadily in this sequence because the first and the last (*King John* and *Henry VIII*) seem to stand apart and of the remaining eight the first quartet was written later than the second one, so that we pass from mature to immature dramatization. Interpretation of the Histories is a crucial test for "spatial" criticism.

Since the late E. M. W. Tillyard suggested that there was an inclusive dramatic pattern in the main series of eight Histories there has been much argument on that score. The prevalent view is that there is not, though there is some support for a certain amount of unity in *Richard II* — *Henry IV* — *Henry V*. On the spirit-body hypothesis it would be possible to make a case for an inclusive unity not simply of the eight main plays but of all ten. The murder of Richard II, which brings a curse upon the House of Lancaster, is expiated not by the uneasy conscience of the usurper Henry IV (in whose reign the kingdom splits in civil war) or his heroic son Henry V (whose pious valour suspends the doom) but in that of Henry VI, whose murder strangely recapitulates that of Richard, but who dies exclaiming, "O God forgive my sins, and pardon thee!" (*3 Henry VI*, v.vi.60) (Cf. Prospero's climactic "I do forgive thee, Unnatural though thou art," *The Tempest*, v.i.78-9.) The usurping House of York must still be self-destroyed by the monster it has brought forth, but then the boy who the martyred Henry VI prophesied would bring peace to England does so, as Henry VII. Despite all the evils of power and violence, the spiritual drama has been the determining one.

But if civil war is the outward equivalent of the split personality of the usurping king, there should be a social as well as a personal reconciliation of spirit and matter in the total design. This is where *King John* and *Henry VIII* suddenly seem to be relevant. *King John* shows the search for the true royal figure and dramatizes the break between the scheming

Church and the self-willed State. *Henry VIII* shows the final overthrow of the proud Church (Wolsey) and the reconciliation of the humble reformed Church (Cranmer) with a State no longer racked by civil war. Is it not a sign of a time in which "spiritual values" are widely felt to be an irrelevance or an embarrassment (we are all "scientific" nowadays) that Shakespeare criticism can find no relevance for *King John* and *Henry VIII* as prologue and epilogue to Shakespeare's royal theme of the spirit's martyrdom in history and its eventual triumph? Of course it may be said that this theme is a myth, and Tudor propaganda at that. But what if it is also the myth of the non-historical plays? And if it was Shakespeare's myth, should it not concern all those who profess to study Shakespeare and not merely to make him over to an acceptable modernity?

And what of the Tragedies? Since the separate plots cannot have the coherence of a series of history plays, one cannot hope to demonstrate a unified focus underlying them in short space. But it has been well said, by Wolfgang Clemen, that the Tragedies are man's most crucial encounter with the universe in the realm of Shakespeare's drama. And it is no accident that here spiritual forces are powerfully projected in stage figures as crucial to the action as the Ghost in *Hamlet* and the apparitions in *Macbeth*. It seems to me that some sort of crisis in Shakespeare's experience of life must be postulated in the series of Tragedies that culminates in the misanthropy of *Timon of Athens* and its strange modulation into mysticism ("nothing brings me all things" — *Timon of Athens,* v.i.189). To what strange dimension of fantasy or enlightenment does that point? To the awakening to music of Pericles, which recapitulates on another level that of the mad King Lear, and ends (like *The Comedy of Errors*) with a family reunion in a temple at Ephesus — only this time we are taken inside the temple. To a play (*Cymbeline*) that recapitulates the jealousy of Othello, but in which the protagonist bears the strange name of Posthumus, whose vision of divinity throws open his prison doors. And to the enchanted isle where Lear and his Cordelia somehow live again as Prospero and Miranda and we learn that "the rarer action is in virtue than in vengeance" (v.i.27-8) and that "We are such stuff As dreams are made on" (IV.i.156-7).

If the former is the echo of the Christian forgiveness of Henry VI, the latter is the mystery of the theatre itself raised into the charmed circle to which Eastern and Western mysticism have found their various ways. One or another of Shakespeare's readers may be tempted to "interpret" his work in one or other of those traditions. To me, for instance, Shakespeare's various uses of the word "nothing" (whose importance in *King Lear* has been much discussed) are illuminated by the Hebrew tradition that came to light later in Ḥabad teaching and is only now being translated into

European languages: of the *yesh* (that-which-is) and the *'ayin* (that-which-is-not). But it is likely that Shakespeare found his own way to the reality (or, if you prefer, illusion) that others have found by other paths. To follow that way, in the incomparably suggestive word-music and myths in which he expressed it, is perhaps the only way to get a glimpse of Shakespeare himself. What one means by calling him the greatest poet is that he does not permit us to do so without also catching a glimpse of what was always most urgent and finally most real to him.

ROY WALKER

I ONCE ASKED one of the most famous of modern critic-poets why, in his writings, he left Shakespeare so pointedly alone. "It 's no good," was the memorable reply. "He is too terrifying; he frightens me." That was the reply of one who had felt Shakespeare more deeply than many who affect familiarity with him; for it is the reply of a man who knows the essential truth about Shakespeare: that he is like life itself, he *is* life itself. The man who pretends to be on familiar terms with life itself knows nothing about it. He lives in a dream, which may seem to him as solid as the four walls of the house in which he dreams it, but is yet a dream. No man knows life unless he has been terrified by it, and unless the possibility of being terrified by it remains for ever in his soul. And to be terrified by life, in this fundamental sense, is not to be terrified merely by the menace of the personal catastrophes which await alike the wary and the unwary, but by the joys and beauties of life also: to have known what it is to feel the fact of birth as far more awful than the fact of death; for death is a mystery which all men acknowledge for a mystery, but the mystery and terror of life each man must discover for himself and by himself alone.

Omnia abeunt in mysterium: "all things lead to a mystery." To realize that this is the truth of life is to be terrified. And this terrifying truth of life is in Shakespeare as it is in no other of the world's great books. . . .

You cannot sit in judgement on life itself. It may make you sad, or happy, or content; but when, in a moment of happiness, you declare that "Life is good," it is not a moral judgement you are passing; you are experiencing, in your small fashion, the divine joy which is attributed to the creator of all things when he looked upon them and found them good, not with a goodness that is the opposite of badness, but each with the simple marvel of its own identity. In Shakespeare we learn to experience the nature of this prime creative joy.

—JOHN MIDDLETON MURRY

THE STAGES OF THE PATH IN BUDDHISM

[THIS is another portion extracted from the forthcoming book, *The Heritage of Buddhism,* by our esteemed friend **Bhikshu Sangharakshita (Sthavira).** With characteristic thoroughness and lucidity he brings out the radical change of direction life undergoes when one "enters the Path." The Buddhist teachings on the subject have an invaluable psychological wisdom to offer. We print below the first part of this rather long study.—ED.]

I

THIS SUBDIVISION of the *Dharma,* being the central one and pragmatically the most valuable, ought to be the clearest and simplest. In fact, however, it is often the most complex, not to say complicated. Such a state of affairs has come about owing principally to two causes. Firstly, formulations of the Path as consisting of a specific set of moral and spiritual qualities or a particular sequence of steps and stages are so numerous, so rich in variety, and withal so often seemingly divergent, that what the Path is *in principle,* apart from all such formulations, is as much lost sight of as the original central trunk of the banyan tree amid the vast proliferation of supporting stems. Secondly, each school of Buddhism has tended to interpret the Path, not only in terms of the common doctrinal tradition, but also in accordance with its own distinctive tenets. In this article we shall be concerned with what the Path is in principle and with the formulation which seems to exhibit that principle with the greatest distinctness.

Man is by nature indefinable. Human life represents a transformation of energy in dependence on which any other transformation of energy, mundane or transcendental, can arise. This is not to say that it is possible for any one such transformation to arise in immediate dependence on any other. As when a seed produces a flower, or when rough ore is smelted into gold and the refined metal wrought into an ornament, a number of intermediate steps connect the beginning with the end of the process. In the case of conditioned sentient existence the transformation takes place through the operation of the laws in accordance with which individualized consciousness determines being, that is to say, through *karma* and *karma-vipāka,* while the intermediate steps are the twelve *nidānas* depicted in the outermost circle of the Wheel of Life. In the case of the higher evolution from a mundane to a transcendental consciousness the laws governing the process are represented by the technical terms *mārga* and *phala,* "path" and "fruit," the intermediate steps being set forth in the negative and positive counterparts of the twelve *nidānas.*

These two sets of terms, that is to say, *karma* and *karma-vipāka,* on the one hand, and *mārga* and *phala* on the other, correspond respectively

to the first two and the second two of the four Noble Truths. In the formula of the Truths, however, the sequence is not deductive from cause to effect, but inductive from effect to cause. Thus *karma* corresponds to the second Noble Truth, the Cause of Suffering (*duḥkha-samudaya*), in this case craving (*tṛṣṇā*), and *karma-vipāka* to the first Noble Truth, namely Suffering (*duḥkha*); similarly, *mārga* corresponds to the fourth Noble Truth, the Way (*mārga*) leading to the Cessation of Suffering, i.e., to *Nirvāṇa*. More philosophically speaking, *karma* and *karma-vipāka*, the first two Noble Truths, and the arising of the twelve *nidānas* from ignorance to birth, old age, disease, and death, represent a process of reaction in a cyclical order between two opposites, such as pleasure and pain, virtue and vice, healthy and unhealthy mental states, as a result of which what is popularly termed "the world" or *saṁsāra* comes into existence. *Mārga* and *phala*, the second two Noble Truths, and the non-arising of the twelve *nidānas* from ignorance to birth, old age, disease, and death, represent not merely the counter-process of cessation, through which "the world" or *saṁsāra* passes out of existence, disappears, or is annihilated, but also a process of reaction in a progressive order between two things of the same genus, the succeeding factor augmenting the effect of the preceding one, through or by means of which the gross, turbulent, and mutually conflicting energies inherent in the *saṁsāra* are progressively refined, transmuted, and transformed into the state of harmonious and beneficent activity popularly termed *Nirvāṇa*.

The process of reaction *in a progressive order* constitutes the basic principle of the Path taught by the Buddha as distinct from the various formulations wherein, for pedagogical reasons, the principle is given concrete expression. As the embodiment of this "spiral" principle, moreover, and not because it represents a "golden mediocrity" of the Aristotelian type or a half-hearted spirit of compromise, the Path receives its primary designation as the Middle Path or Way (*Madhyama-Mārga*). In the "*Nidāna-Vagga*" of the *Saṁyutta-Nikāya* the number of intermediate steps which connect the *saṁsāric* beginning with the *Nirvāṇic* "end" of the process whereby mundane is transformed into transcendental mind appear as a series of positive counterparts to the negative process of the cessation of the twelve *nidānas*.

In the canonical passage referred to the twelve factors constituting what may be termed the positive and progressive aspect of the *pratītya-samutpāda* (process of conditioned co-production) are enumerated three times, once in descending and twice in ascending order. According to the latter mode of enumeration there is causal association of *saddhā* with *dukkha*, *pamojjā* with *saddhā*, *pīti* with *pamojjā*, *passaddhi* with *pīti*, *sukha* with *passaddhi*, *samādhi* with *sukha*, *yathābhūtañāṇadassana* with *samādhi*,

nibbida with *yathābhūtañāṇadassana, virāga* with *nibbida, vimutti* with *virāga,* and *khayañāṇa* with *vimutti.*[1]

(i) *Dukkha* (Skt., *duḥkha*) or suffering. This is not only the first member of the *Nirvāṇic* but according to our present text the last of the *saṃsāric* series, here replacing the more usual *jarā-maraṇa* or old age and death. As the second of the two *nidānas* which make up the result-process of the future life it corresponds to *vedanā,* or feeling, the last of the five *nidānas* constituting the result-process of the present life. It also corresponds to the first Noble Truth or, more generally, to "the world" as presented to the sense and the mind. Upon the attitude which we take up towards it depends our future fate. If we react with craving (*tṛṣṇā*), the first *nidāna* of the action-process of the present life, then we become once again caught up in the process of reaction in a cyclic order between opposites and the Wheel of Life continues to revolve. If we refuse to react in this manner and respond instead with a healthy mental attitude we are carried out of the *saṁsāra* into the process of reaction in a progressive order between two counterparts or complements at the "end" of which lies *Nirvāṇa. Vedanā* in general and *dukkha* in particular thus represent the point of intersection of the two different orders of reaction. It is the point of choice and decision, a choice, moreover, which confronts us not on two or three momentous occasions only but every instant of our lives.

Theoretically, of course, a total annihilation of craving, with a consequent instantaneous realization of *Nirvāṇa,* is possible at any time. In practice it is impossible. Whenever such cases seem to occur they will be found, on examination, to be the result of prolonged preparation. Nor might it be advisable to attempt a really instantaneous total destruction of craving even if this could be achieved. As with a sudden slamming on of brakes when the train is going at full speed such an achievement is likely to result in a derailment. What is needed is a smooth and gradual application of brakes. However quickly, or however slowly, they may be applied, the mechanical process of application consists of a certain number of stages. In the present series the first of these stages is represented by the second *nidāna.* In causal association with *dukkha* arises *saddhā.*

(ii) *Saddhā* (Skt., *śraddhā*) or faith. Though the Indian term is by no means equivalent to "belief" in the Christian sense of accepting as literally true statements about God, the Fall of Man, the Virgin Birth, etc., for which there is no evidence, we have nevertheless rendered it by "faith" in order to emphasize its definitely emotional character. *Saddhā* is, in fact, the healthy counterpart of *taṇhā* (Skt. *tṛṣṇā*), thirst or craving. It develops when, as the result of our experience of the painful, unsatisfactory, and

---

[1] *Saṁyutta-Nikāya,* XII. 23, 28.

frustrating nature of *samsāric* existence, we begin to "place the heart" (the literal meaning of the verb with which *saddhā* is connected) not so much on the conditioned as on the Unconditioned. At first this is no more than a vague intermittent stirring of the emotions, hesitant and confused. But as it grows stronger, and as its object comes more clearly into focus, it develops into *saddhā* proper, that is to say, into faith in the Buddha, the *Dharma,* and the Sangha, the first being primary, the other two secondary. Taken in this more definite sense *saddhā* may be defined as the heartfelt acknowledgement of the fact that the historical personality Gautama is the Buddha or Enlightened One, grounded, firstly on the intuitive response that arises out of the depth of our heart by reason of the affinity existing between His actual and our potential Buddhahood, and secondly on the sensible evidence and rational proofs of His Enlightenment afforded us by the records of His life and teachings. When by following the *Dharma* we experience for ourselves the successive stages of the Path this faith, without losing its emotional character, becomes consolidated into confidence. At the stage with which we are now concerned *saddhā* expresses itself as generosity (*dāna*) and ethical behaviour (*sīla*), which are the first two *pāramitās*. Through the practice of these virtues the mind is purged of its feelings of guilt, repentance, and remorse, and thus a healthy mental attitude is created. In causal association with *saddhā* arises *pamojja.*

(iii) *Pamojjā* (Skt., *pramodya*) or satisfaction and delight. Negatively this is the feeling experienced on becoming aware that one has nothing with which to reproach oneself as to morals. As such it is equivalent to the possession of an easy conscience. Positively it is the feeling of cheerfulness and content that arises in a man's mind out of his awareness that he is following the path of virtue. In Buddhism great importance is attached to this state. A mind that is disturbed by the recollection of a breach of moral precepts is incapable of concentration, so that the way to farther progress is barred. Meditation masters such as Chih-che, the founder of the Chinese Tien-tai school, therefore, recommend that before embarking on the practice of *dhyāna* one who has been guilty of any such lapse should undergo various observances, including confession, repentance, ritual worship of the Buddha, and the ceremonial recitation of *sūtras,* for a certain number of days, weeks, or months, or until such time as his mind is freed from the burden of guilt and again feels fresh, clear, and light.[2] Whether induced in the former or in the latter manner, *pamojjā* represents a blending (*modanā*) of the various elements in the emotive aspect of concentration, because the absence or resolution of the conflicts which arise whenever a man's behaviour fails to accord with his own ethical ideals inevitably pro-

[2] "Dhyana for Beginners," Chapter I of *A Buddhist Bible.* Edited by DWIGHT GODDARD. (London, 1956.) pp. 441-4.

motes a sense of unity, harmony, and integration. As this develops and grows stronger, in causal association with *pamojjā* arises *pīti*.

(iv) *Pīti* (Skt., *prīti*), or interest, enthusiasm, joy, rapture, ecstasy. This *nidāna*, the development of which marks the transition from the *kāmaloka* to the *rūpaloka* or in other words to a level of consciousness higher than that of the "normal" waking state, arises naturally and spontaneously in the course of meditation practice as methodical concentration on a given object becomes more and more intense. Just as in the state represented by the previous *nidāna* the absence of any conflict between one's ethical ideals and one's actions produces a feeling of satisfaction and delight, so *pīti* represents the much greater sense of relief which comes about as the result of the liberation of the emotional energies which had been locked up in the deep-seated conflicts of the unconscious mind. Guenther therefore quite rightly speaks of it as "a driving and even overwhelming emotion."[3] As, by a sort of psychological chain-reaction, greater and greater quantities of energy are released, *pīti* becomes more and more transporting. Tradition therefore distinguishes a number of different degrees of *pīti*. In the words of the *Aṭṭhasālinī*:

> Rapture is of five kinds: — the lesser thrill, momentary rapture, flooding rapture, all-pervading rapture, and transporting rapture. Of these, the lesser thrill is only able to raise the hairs of the body; the momentary rapture is like the production of lightning moment by moment; like waves breaking on the seashore, the flooding rapture descends on the body and breaks; [when all-pervading rapture arises, the whole body is completely surcharged, blown like a full bladder or like a mountain cavern pouring forth a mighty flood of water];[4] the transporting rapture is strong, and lifts the body up to the extent of launching it in the air.[5]

From these descriptions it is evident that far from being only mental *pīti* is accompanied by a variety of physical innervations. It is this which distinguishes it from *sukha*, the next *nidāna* but one. Hence before *sukha* can arise, in causal association with *pīti* arises *passaddhi*.

BHIKSHU SANGHARAKSHITA

(*To be concluded*)

---

[3] *Philosophy and Psychology in the Abhidharma* (Lucknow, 1957), p. 77.

[4] *The Expositor* (*Aṭṭhasālinī*). Translated by MAUNG TIN. (London, 1920). Vol. I, p. 154.

[5] *Ibid.*, p. 153.

JUNGIAN PSYCHOLOGY AND THE VEDANTA

[THIS interesting first sketch in comparison of the theories of Carl Jung and the teachings of the Vedanta brings out how they are parallel in accepting the presence and importance of that invisible profundity in Man which seldom appears in his ordinary concerns. Both demand a rejoining of surface man with his spiritual roots. The subject deserves careful further study.

The writer, **Mr. Edward Thornton**, is a London psychologist and Vedantin. He studied under Jung during 1947-50. He was closely associated with the founding of the Ramakrishna Vedanta Centre of London, and is Director of the Institute for Psychological and Spiritual Studies now in the process of formation in London. This is concerned with psychological and spiritual difficulties attending the second half of life. He has also been associated with our esteemed friend Mr. Kenneth Walker in the sponsoring of cultural relations between India and the West.—ED.].

WHEN considering the comparative attributes of the Vedanta and the psychology of Carl Gustav Jung I should like it to be understood from the outset that Jung was a Doctor of Medicine and a psychiatrist. Of all the reviews I have read of Jung's recently published autobiography, that from the pen of Kathleen Raine was very much to the point. The article called Jung a "sent Man" and concluded by saying that he was essentially an Aesculapian.

Whenever Jung was accused of permitting himself to encroach upon the domains of theology and philosophy, he stressed time and time again that he was an empiricist, and consequently had to abide by the facts presented to him and would never allow himself to indulge in metaphysical speculation. He was a doctor and had to speak strictly from his clinical experience. This being the case, Jung's vocation was concerned with suffering, spiritual, and mental, as well as physical; we can therefore understand his continual refusal to introduce the Vedanta and other Eastern traditions in his essential clinical work, although it is evident to all that he possessed a most profound veneration for those traditions.

If therefore this difference is comprehended between Jung's psychology and the sublime system of monist Vedanta, we can proceed with the study of the comparative attributes of both, and for my introduction to this theme I have chosen the great Commentary of Shankara on the *Mandukyopanishad*. This is one of the shortest of all the *Upanishads*, and is concerned with the meaning and nature of the most sacred of all Sanskrit syllables (*mantras*), *OM*.

The first *shloka* of the Upanishad instructs us that

> All this is verily Brahman. The Atman is Brahman.
> This Atman has four quarters.

It is pointed out that this *Atman* appears to be divided into four parts, namely the Waking State (*Vaishwanara*), the Dream State (*Taijasa*), the State of Dreamless Sleep (*Prajna*), and the state of transcendental Super-consciousness (*Turiya*) which is identical with Brahman or Atman.

The first three quarters correspond to the three letters (*matras*) which constitute the sacred syllable, namely A U M, and the assumption into itself of all three marks the transcendent fourth, which has no corresponding letter or sound (is *amatra*). This silence or *Atman* is equivalent with the fourth quarter called *Turiya*.

> This first quarter is Vaishwanara whose sphere (of activity) is the waking state, who is conscious of external objects, who has seven limbs and nineteen mouths and whose experience consists of gross (material) objects.
>
> The second quarter is the Taijasa whose sphere (of activity) is the dream, who is conscious of internal objects, who has seven limbs and nineteen mouths and who experiences subtle objects.
>
> That is the state of deep sleep wherein the sleeper does not desire any objects nor does he see any dream. The third quarter is the Prajna whose sphere is deep sleep, in whom all experiences become unified or undifferentiated, who is verily a mass of consciousness entire, who is full of bliss, and who is the path leading to the knowledge (of the other two states).
>
> This is the Lord of all; this is the controller within; this is the source of all; and this is that from which all things originate and in which they finally disappear.

This last is the experience of the very few illumined beings who point the way of all human existence, and have bequeathed to humanity the facts of their experience in the realm of supra-personal God-consciousness; whether the saint be of the Eastern or Western traditions. Such a being was Shankara, and it is understandable that as a monist (*advaitin*) he was concerned fundamentally with the end experience, although he left invaluable instructions and advice for those aspirants whose destiny was to be chiefly in the realm of the dualistic approach to the Divine. It is perhaps for all these reasons that Shankara paid little attention to the waking and dream states as such; for he regarded both as illusory from the standpoint of the supreme experience of *Turiya*. Nevertheless he stressed in all his writings that the phenomenal world as well as the dream world are real and must not be disregarded or rejected so long as a person has not attained to the state of *Turiya*, which, in the Vedanta, is said to be experienced in *Nirvikalpa Samadhi* (Contentless Super-consciousness). Now this *Nirvikalpa Samadhi* is the end-result of all contemplative experience, and consequently demands the practice of spiritual austerities, which *must* include the practice of meditation, culminating with contemplation in the sense of concentration in complete inner absorption. That

this sublime spiritual vocation is not meant for everybody was revealed by that great spiritual genius Shri-Ramakrishna in the following story:

> Once, finding it difficult to reconcile the contradictory doctrines of man's free will and God's grace, two disciples of the Master went to him for a solution of the same.
>
> The Master said, "Why do you talk of free will? Everything is dependent on the Lord's will. Our will is tied to the Lord's like the cow to its tether. No doubt we have a certain amount of freedom even as the cow has, within a prescribed circle. So man thinks that his will is free. But know that his will is dependent on the Lord's."
>
> DISCIPLES: "Is there then no necessity of practising penance, meditation and the rest? For one can as well sit quiet and say, 'It is all God's will; whatever is done, is done at His will.'"
>
> SHRI-RAMAKRISHNA: "Oh, to what effect, if you simply say that in so many words? Any amount of your verbal denial of thorns can never save you from their painful prick when you place your hand on them. Had it been entirely with man to do spiritual practices according to his will, everybody would have done so. But no; everyone can't do it, and why? But there is one thing: If you don't utilize properly the amount of strength He has given you, He never gives you more. That is why self-exertion is necessary. And so everyone has to struggle hard even to become fit for the grace of God. By such endeavour, and through His grace, the sufferings of many lives can be worked out in one life. But some self-effort is absolutely necessary."

It will be apparent that such a fulfilment of human perfection is given to but very few; yet all these agree in all essentials and are therefore the greatest teachers of humanity, for they prefigure the ultimate fulfilment of the human race. As has been said, Shankara was by no means forgetful of mankind as a whole, and his dissertations on the dualistic approach should therefore be heeded with our greatest attention.

It is fundamentally in this realm of experience that the ideas of Jung come very close to those of Shankara, but it must be borne in mind that Jung was concerned with the treatment of neuroses and psychoses, and not with a philosophical system. In his treatment of the psychologically and spiritually sick Jung found that the dream state (*Taijasa*, as it is called in our Upanishad) produced phenomena in the shape of dreams which had a compensatory nature opposite to that of the waking state (*Vaishwanara*). Often it was found by him that the narrowness of the waking state, or consciousness, as he called it, produced a mental attitude to reality which was far too inadequate for the individual concerned, the consequence being that the person succumbed to neurotic illness. A careful attention to his dreams, however, would give a compensatory stress from the unconscious (*Taijasa*), so that assimilation of the material would lead to a greater wholeness of the patient concerned, and a consequent disappearance of

the neurotic symptom. Similarly the modern so-called "enlightened" individual, who finds the origin of his orientation to life in the rationalistic philosophy of Descartes, would experience a compensation to his inadequate conscious attitude from the deep chthonic strata of the unconscious psyche, which would stress his need for the acceptance of his spiritual roots, which manifest themselves in his own line of cultural heritage, often going back into very deep experience of extremely archaic connotation. It was with regard to this great number of "scientifically" educated men and women that Jung had to occupy himself so enormously, and showed that although the clarity of so many Oriental philosophies is so helpful, one cannot jump out of one's *karmic* obligations; indeed, before one could veritably occupy oneself with the higher flights of *yoga* (*Raja-Yoga*) one had to come to terms with one's own nature. Lord Jesus said something of the kind when he maintained that one would not be released until the uttermost farthing had been paid.

In a brief article of this nature it is of course impossible to go into the details either of psychological technique or the nature of dream interpretation. Suffice it to say that for the latter a knowledge of comparative religions, mythology, and the nature of symbolism is indispensable; consequently, the layman often finds himself unequal to such an undertaking.

According to Jung the psyche is the totality of all conscious and unconscious processes, and one cannot but be reminded of the close similarity of his terminology with that contained in the *Mandukyopanishad,* but as has already been stated Jung's *swa-dharma* (sacred vocation) was that of an Aesculapian, and not of a spiritual teacher in the strict meaning of that term. It was for this reason that he constantly insisted on pinning himself and his pupils down to empirical facts which emerged in the course of his *own* and his clinical work.

The compensatory nature of the unconscious psyche to that of consciousness reveals an active matrix inherent in the psyche. It is the realm from whence prefigurations, prescience, and often prophetic insights are derived; hence it is a realm of the psyche, a knowledge and experience of which are indispensable to modern psycho-therapy. In his vast research and practice Jung indeed found something in an empirical way which is highly relevant to our subject. He ascertained, namely, two things which belong here:

> 1. *That the human psyche possesses an autochthonous religious function,* and 2. *That he never cured a patient who found himself in the second half of life, without the patient having found access to this genuine religious function.*

Concerning the third quarter referred to in our Upanishad, namely the state of dreamless sleep (*Prajna*), it should be noted that it is called "a

mass of consciousness, entire, who is full of bliss, and who experiences bliss." Now this state of bliss, from the point of view of the contemplative, would represent the unconscious nature of the fifth body or *kosha* of Vedantic tradition, namely the *Anandamayakosha* (the body of bliss). In contemplative practice this becomes consciously experienced in a dynamic positive sense. This is essentially the experience of the religious adept; hence scarcely likely to become the subject of the psychotherapist's scrutiny.

In his clinical work Jung would always ask himself, "What could possibly be the meaning of a psychosis?" The use of the term "meaning" in this connection should be understood as having the same significance as "function," namely, the function of a break-through of predominantly collective unconscious material into consciousness. The question of meaning is also concerned with the possibility of a cure and consequently of a possible therapy. This latter would mean the same as the constructive employment of the hitherto destructive demons, and would produce a totally changed situation as compared with the pre-morbid starting situation.

"Meaning" has to do here with *telos* (goal) and to a great extent is therefore identical with the question of a *causa finalis* (final cause). Jung made the proposal that schizophrenic illnesses are to be understood as a "gigantic attempt at compensation" by the unconscious; compensation for a narrowness of consciousness, or, as he said once, of the *Weltanschauung* of the individual concerned.

All these processes of the human psyche, Jung confirmed in all his greater writings, and showed that these point towards a goal (*telos*). Out of his therapeutic experience he never tired of drawing attention to the fact that the psyche's possessing the same attributes in all traditions confirms this eternal process within the human soul in the nature of *mandala* formations, all of which incline towards a centre of the personality which Jung called the Self.

He was unfamiliar with the static Centre of Self (*Turiya*) of the Vedantic tradition in his therapeutic work, but maintained that the psyche, being of immense age, showed indisputable verification of the fact that it was proceeding to the sublime consummation (*entelechie*). Hence his empirical findings would imply that last *shloka* of our Upanishad:

> This is the source of all, and this is that from which all things originate and in which they finally disappear.*

EDWARD THORNTON

---

* References:

The Mandukyopanishad with Gaudapada's Karika and Shankara's Commentary. Translated and annotated by SWAMI NIKHILANANDA, (Shri-Ramakrishna Ashrama, Mysore).

Einige Konsequenzen der neueren Psychologie. By CARL ALFRED MEIER. (Studia Philosophica, Jahrbuch der Schweizerischen Gesellschaft, Zuerich, Switzerland).

Tales and Parables of Sri Ramakrishna. (Shri-Ramakrishna Math, Mylapore, Madras.)

KNOWLEDGE AND LANGUAGE

[**Mr. Robert Powell, Ph.D., D.I.C.**, studied pure and applied science at Amsterdam and London Universities. At present he is on the editorial staff of a well-known chemical journal in London. In 1961 he published *Zen and Reality,* in which he concerned himself with the truth which lies beyond all philosophical formulation and the way to its attainment. He has been a frequent contributor to religious and philosophical journals in both India and the United Kingdom.

In this article he considers the questions, What do we mean by knowledge? and, Who is it that knows?—Ed.]

What do we mean by knowledge? And who is it that knows? It is these fundamental questions which the following brief article attempts to elucidate.

As is now generally known, in the beginning of this century Albert Einstein destroyed the then prevalent concept of an absolute framework of reference in which to observe phenomena, and established as the only so-called "absolute" reality the relationship in space and time between an observer and an object. Now it has always been a subject of some wonder to me why this revolution in physics has not prompted thinkers to extend the principle of relativity to the actual act of observation itself, i.e., to the physio-psychological process of perception and its corollary the mental act of cognition. Perception and the resulting "knowledge" would then simply be seen as a relationship between observer and object *quite regardless of frames of reference.* This would, therefore, be true even in an absolute universe, such as was thought to exist before the advent of Einstein's Theory of Relativity, and so would represent a truth of a more fundamental nature, being independent of considerations of space and time.

Seen in this light, "knowledge," instead of being absolute and static, becomes relative and dynamic. If we cling to the accepted meaning of the word, knowledge is subjective. For each observer a specific picture of the "outside" world exists, different from that of any other observer, because his knowledge is literally "unique."

Having come thus far, the next logical step is to draw the inevitable conclusions from the above statements which result naturally from an understanding of the mechanism of perception. These could, for instance, be formulated as follows:

"There exists a continuous process only, *viz.,* that of knowing, experiencing, and there are no clear-cut entities such as the knower and his subject (and the 'act' of knowing), since the delimitation (and so the definition) of these entities is also subjective and arbitrary. This ultimately signifies the end of all verbalizing to express philosophical Truth."

At this stage, a number of difficulties might crop up, and the reader might well be loath to accept the above theses because they seem to conflict with his everyday experience. He will very probably consider our conclusions merely a fanciful philosophical theory, which is obviously completely divorced from reality as anyone can see for himself. Otherwise, how would it be possible to use a common language and to maintain ordinary human communications, if each of us lives in a private world of his own?

This is what I would like to call the "common-sense" objection (which can be taken both ways!); it is certainly a most formidable argument and goes right to the heart of the matter. It is also a very old one, for it was already raised by Socrates in the philosophical discussion on subjectivism and similar theories of knowledge. There is, however, a complete answer to it, which will lead us at the same time to a deeper understanding of a second problem, that of "language." The point is that it is not subjective knowledge which makes a common language impossible but rather the other way round: it is only language which makes possible the communication of subjective knowledge. It is also language which *conceals* for us the subjectivity — by making knowledge appear to us concrete and objective.

You see, language only makes us refer to the same things, but that is all it does. Among ourselves these apparently common experiences may be poles apart but we are never aware of it, because it is impossible to communicate these experiences to others except in terms of language and there the vicious circle closes again. What really happens in learning a language is that certain associations are permanently established, so that henceforth *we shall refer to the same thing* without telling anything about its real nature. On a less philosophical and more personal level, this fact is also responsible for one of our great difficulties in self-knowing. When we experience a certain feeling (e.g., fear, anger, envy, or loneliness) we always approach it through a screen of words, with their mental associations; therefore we never look at, and come emotionally in contact with, the actual feeling. As long as there is recognition there is mentation, which precludes total perception. For example, we are looking at an apple, the colour of which is red. Now this colour impresses my retina, optic nerve, and finally brain in a specific manner which might be totally different from anybody else's experience. (In fact it *is* always unique for each of us, owing to the uniqueness of the individual's neuro-physiological make-up.) However, in the learning process one is taught that whenever one has the same particular sensuous experience one ought to call it "red," or recognize it as such. So it can be understood that a red colour may give rise in different persons to feelings of so-called "redness," which in themselves, however, may be just as different from each other, or more, to use a some-

what paradoxical analogy — as red and green are different from each other. (In this connection any argument based on colour blindness may appropriately be called a "red herring," for the person possessed of this peculiarity suffers merely from a defect in his *differentiation* of sensuous experiences, whereas absolute values do not come into it; e.g., both red and green give rise to an identical visual impression.)

When we were children and learning to speak, a permanent association established itself between a particular feeling which was experienced and the word "red." Thus this word denotes a strictly private relationship between ourselves and a sensation, and so does every word in our language. Our brain is so conditioned by the continual application of language for communication that thought-patterns are often retained in it as verbal memory images.

Another question which should now become clear is the relationship of the particular to the Universal. What we perceive is always the particular, whereas the Universal appertains to language, and represents the naming and the classification of the experience — this being the basis of language.

In Kant's philosophy we encountered the difficulty that although it was postulated that the "thing in itself" exists, one could never know it. In the light of the theory of knowledge which has been propounded here, the apparent difficulty no longer occurs, because it makes the previous formulation of the problem appear nonsensical. If knowledge is apprehended as a relationship it does not make sense to say: "The 'thing-in itself' is unknowable," like something which has an absolute existence in its own right but is beyond human perception.

This would be just as absurd as it is — since Einstein — to talk about Absolute Space or Absolute Time, and in fact it would be a very similar fallacy.

All knowledge is relative to the observer. If as a result of our newly acquired insight we now extend the semantic significance of the terms "knowledge" and "know" we can then state that there is no difference between the "thing in itself" and the thing as it appears to us — or as we "know" it.

Our final conclusion may be summarized aptly yet accurately by stating that the knower, the "knowing," and the known are one.

ROBERT POWELL

KNOW also that I am the knower in every mortal body, O son of Bharata; that knowledge which through the soul is a realization of both the known and the knower is alone esteemed by me as wisdom.

—*The Bhagavad-Gītā*

CANADIAN POETRY IN ENGLISH

[**Shri Dilip Kumar Sen** has often contributed literary notes to our pages. In this article he introduces us to some notable Canadian poets.—ED.]

VOLTAIRE in his *Candide* sneeringly sums up Canada as "a few acres of snow." No doubt, with that opinion of his the majority of his contemporaries would have disagreed, as these acres of snow provided fish in large quantities to Catholic Europe. The opening up of Canada was due to that intrepid French sea-dog, Jacques Cartier, who discovered the St. Lawrence in 1535. He called the district Mont Royal and claimed it for France, but it proved too difficult for French colonizers and Canada was almost forgotten. In 1608 another daring Frenchman, Champlain, established a settlement on the spot where Quebec now stands and made friends with the native Red Indian tribes. He was appointed Governor of New France, as the colony was called and laid the foundations of a French empire.

British public opinion regarded Canada as a "fog-bound desert of ice," but its shrewd business instinct found commercial possibilities in the almost inexhaustible store of furs and fish of this new country. These commodities lured the English to Canada and soon there was considerable rivalry between the English merchants and their French counterparts. Thanks to the intrepid action of General Wolfe, French power came to an abrupt end. In 1763 Canada became an English colony where French Canadians were allowed to keep their land, their Roman Catholic faith, and their language, civil laws, and customs.

The Seven Years' War brought Canada under the suzerainty of the British. Another war helped her to become a nation. When the American War of Independence started many Loyalists from the American colonies trekked to Canada. This large influx of pro-English colonists gave her the unique distinction of being a country having two faces — one looking longingly at France and the other resolutely at England. But this double-facedness did not prevent Canada from becoming a close-knit nation *a mare usque ad mare,* when during the Napoleonic Wars the United States declared war on Britain and made an attempt to annex Canada. This crisis helped to bring all Canadians together and the Loyalists, the French Canadians, and even the Indians combined together to resist the invasion successfully. Thus was born the Canadian nation.

This brief sketch of the emergence of Canada as a nation is necessary for any systematic study of the development of poetry there.

The beginnings are, of course, obscure, and one can easily concede that the atmosphere was not at all a favourable one for the sensitive plant of poetry to thrive. Geographically, Canada was a huge land mass where

human habitation was like a "flurry of wild rain, drifting across the darkened pane." Furthermore, the handful of mortals inhabiting this "palaeolithic face" had different affiliations.

These were no doubt serious hindrances but they could not keep in check the instinctive human desire to lisp in numbers. Broadly speaking, the history of poetry written in English in Canada has three well-marked stages. The first stage was between the years 1815 and 1867. The writers were either professional men, born and educated in Britain, or they were pioneers, with iron and grit in their bones, living precariously in a country neither much loved nor much understood. The shanties built by the weather-beaten hands of the early settlers were often burnt to cinders when forest fires raged. One of the early poets describes vividly the fury of the tongues of fire:

How did they snort, in fiendish sport,
As at the great elms dashing,
And how they tore 'mong hemlocks hoar.
And through the pines went crashing,
While serpents wound the trunks around,
Their eyes like demons gleaming.
And wrapped like thongs around the prongs,
And to the crests went screaming!

Other themes were sentimental homesickness for the mother country and heroic stories of man's sheer endurance and noble *camaraderie*. Representatives *par excellence* of the educated classes are Joseph Howe and Susannah Moodie. Alexander McLachlan is a spirited spokesman of the sturdy peasant immigrants, while Charles Heaysege and Charles Sangster voice the aspirations and woes of the working classes. They have all now earned the distinction of being venerated as classics of Canadian poetry, but one of them, Heaysege, deserves to be remembered in the annals of English literature for his mammoth poetic drama *Saul*, which curiously anticipates in form and machinery, as well as perhaps in its fine gloom, *The Dynasts* of Thomas Hardy.

The second phase of poetry starts with 1867, an *annus mirabilis* in Canadian literary history; for it is the year of the Confederation, which created the federal dominion of Canada. This important event stimulated a sense of national pride and gave a great impetus to literature as well as to industrial and political growth. It almost turned the country into a nest of singing birds. The noteworthy poets of this period were Charles Mair, Charles G. D. Roberts, Bliss Carman, Archibald Lampman, Duncan Campbell Scott (who inspired Masefield), and Marjorie Pickthall. Their poetry was true to the tradition of English verse in form and expression, but in subject and mood definitely Canadian, as one finds in this poem by Lamp-

man:

How deep the April night is in its noon,
The hopeful, solemn, many-murmured night!
The earth lies hushed with expectation, bright
Above the world's dark border burns the moon,
Yellow and large, from forest floorways, strewn
With flowers, and fields that tingle with new birth,
The moist smell of the unimprisoned earth
Comes up, a sigh, a haunting promise. . . .

Duncan Campbell Scott was perhaps the first Canadian poet to probe sympathetically into the heart of the Red Indian. In his *Watkwenies* he describes an old Iroquois woman, beautifully contrasts the memories of her nation's glorious past with her own shameful lot, and transforms her into a poignantly pathetic figure:

Vengeance was once her nation's lore and law;
When the tired sentry stooped above the rill,
Her long knife flashed, and hissed and drank its fill;
Dimly below her dripping wrist she saw
One wild hand, pale as death and weak as straw,
Clutch at the ripple in the pool; while shrill
Sprang through the dreaming hamlet on the hill
The war-cry of the triumphant Iroquois.
Now clothed with many an ancient flap and fold,
And wrinkled like an apple kept till May
She weighs the interest-money in her palm
And when the Agent calls her valiant name
Hears, like the war-whoops of her perished day,
The lads playing snow-snake in the stinging cold.

Another poet of this period, Robert Service, keeps alive the tradition of the colonizer. The rough and tumble of life in the backwoods has instinctive appeal for him and he extols the saga of a pioneer life:

Let us probe the silent places, let us seek what luck betide us;
Let us journey to a lonely land, I know.
There's a whisper on the night-wind, there's a star agleam to guide us,
And the wind is calling . . . let us go.

The last phase was ushered in by the war of 1914-18. It opens with the name of John McCrae, by profession a medical man. His title to a glorious place in the Halls of Fame is his exquisite poem "In Flanders Fields," born of fire and blood during the hottest phase of the Second Battle of Ypres. The intricate pattern of the rondeau form in which it is composed, the careful art, the studied moderation in tone, and the intense emotion — all these fuse together to produce a quintessence of poetic beauty.

In Flanders fields the poppies blow
Between the crosses, row on row,
  That mark our place; and in the sky
  The larks, still bravely singing, fly
Scarce heard amid the guns below.
We are the Dead. Short days ago
We lived, felt dawn, saw sunset glow,
  Loved and were loved, and now we lie
    In Flanders fields.
Take up our quarrel with the foe:
To you from failing hands we throw
  The torch; be yours to hold it high.
  If you break faith with us who die
We shall not sleep, though poppies grow
    In Flanders fields.

Yet McCrae was not original; the note of originality was struck in 1925 in "The Cachalot" by E. J. Pratt, who by his temper, his metrical tendency, his choice of theme, came like a sea-wave, sweeping everything before him. Early in life he had seen the whaling steamers tow the whales into harbour and moor them belly up until they were taken to the factories. In "The Cachalot" he derives his inspiration from this boyhood experience of his, but presents the theme in a manner which shows clearly that his sympathy is with the whale. Moby Dick was for Herman Melville an incarnation of evil in the world, but for Pratt the whale is a symbol of its strength, enviable, admirable:

And when the cachalot outwore
The squid's tenacious clasp, he tore
From frame and socket, shred by shred,
Each gristled, writhing tentacle,
And with the serrated mandible
Sawed cleanly through the bulbous head.

Pratt is unquestionably the leader of the new group of poets in Canada. His work abounds with sounding words that contribute to the rush of the action, and he stands apart from others not because of his staccato and rough style but because by turning to the medium of narrative rather than the lyric, he harked back to the literary tradition of the pioneers and remained truly Canadian.

Canadian poetry in the fifties of this century became, like poetry elsewhere, highly experimental, individual, and sometimes obscure. Two of the *avant garde* of the poets, F. R. Scott and A. J. M. Smith, realized that established techniques were not suited to contemporary conditions, and in searching for a new mode of expression came under the spell of Yeats,

Pound, and Eliot. Scott has a sly sense of humour, which comes out quite frequently in his poems, as in "The Canadian Authors Meet":

> Expansive puppets percolate self-unction
> Beneath a portrait of the Prince of Wales.
> Miss Crotchet's muse has somehow failed to function
> Yet she's a poetess. Beaming, she sails
> From group to chattering group, with such a dear
> Victorian saintliness, as is her fashion,
> Greeting the other unknowns with a cheer,
> Virgins of sixty who still write of passion.

In recent years a new group of poets showing intense social consciousness has come to the fore. James Reaney is one of these. His poetry is obscure, full of imagery and symbolism. Irving Layton has the savage wit, the erotic preoccupations, and the frequent unevenness of an E. E. Cummings. Other outstanding young poets are Jay Macpherson, Leonard Cohen, and Daryl Hine. They write clearly and concisely, with sharp intelligence and apparent simplicity, but often instil into their poetry implications which have to be searched for.

Canadian poetry is relatively young, but already it has made rapid strides. A Canadian poet has a critical familiarity with poetic advances in the United States and England, a kinetic sensitivity to his social environment; and these factors have produced a Canadian poetry which is urgent, which can exist as poetry while remaining (not only geographically) distinguishable as Canadian. It is Canadian not because it is written by the natives of the country; nor is it Canadian because it has Canadian themes — it is Canadian because it represents the attitude to life and things that can be conditioned by Canada and by Canada alone. Critics may discover the absence of any "original" Canadian accent in Canadian poetry, but perhaps it is no longer possible to look for originality in literature, as Dudek, a modern Canadian poet tells us:

> We cut ourselves off from the main tradition of poetry and from the best practice in modern poetry, when we set ourselves against foreign influence and try to defend something "native" or "original." There is nothing native and original but barbarism.

DILIP KUMAR SEN

THE BASIS AND ROOT of poetry is spontaneous utterance of the undivided being. It is not the utterance of thought, neither is it the utterance of emotion: it is the utterance of the being before these faculties are differentiated. This primordial being exists in every man, and is the substance of his own reality.

—JOHN MIDDLETON MURRY

THE FALLACY OF FIRST IMPRESSIONS

[**Shri Ramesh Chandra Shah**, of the English Department of the Government Motilal Vigyan Mahavidyalaya, Bhopal, has written a lively personal essay in treating of the effect and true validity of first impressions. He commends to us an attitude of modest distrust of our own powers of penetration and an amiable readiness to reconsider any unfavourable impressions of others. Indeed, to look into the hearts of men is a power attained only after much spiritual discipline.—ED.]

IMPRESSIONS — one would suppose — are ideas in the making; fleeting shadows rather than firm structures. They may or may not crystallize into opinions; that will always depend upon the chain of reactions they have undergone inside the mental test-tube. None of us can be sure about the course they might take — their ways are past finding out. They are always chasing, colouring, augmenting, or cancelling each other. We catch an impression of a person. That first impression may be vague or vivid, pleasing or repulsive; it may soon disappear from the memory altogether or it may go on haunting us for a long time. But it need not for all that exhaust all the possibilities of the person then and there. Much will still elude us.

At least that is what our reason tells us. But there is an oft-quoted proverb which would have us believe otherwise. According to this proverb, "A first impression is the last impression." The pronouncement — be it noted — has a decisive ring. There is a fatal finality about it admitting of no qualification whatever. The first impression is the last impression; not merely an impression that lasts. As such it must act as an omnipotent dictator in the realm of human relationships. There is an unmistakable determinism about this popular impressionism. "Impressions are all," says the Impressionist artist or critic. "No, the first impression is all," says the man of the world.

You can of course go one step ahead and enter the territory of "Imperfect Sympathies" — the dear old prejudices so well described and defended by Charles Lamb — prejudices which prepare us to meet a man not as an individual but as the foredoomed member of a certain race, region, or nationality. But I have known people of perfect as well as imperfect sympathies guided by first impressions. Even wise and well-meaning people cannot always escape being carried away by them. Many of us have no other reason to dislike a person except that we happened to dislike him when we were introduced. Later experiences may modify our first reaction; we may even discover endearing traits where once we found nothing but a callous heart and an arrogant head. But alas! it is of no use now. The mischief is done and the initial picture is past all redemption. In our undivided loyalty to the first image, we must incorrigibly and irrevocably be set against the real living object for ever. Damn the poor

fellow rather than assent with second thoughts. Love at first sight or do not love at all.

Such is the power of first impressions over mankind. And it is omnipresent too. Our offices are no more exempt from it than our universities. Belief in the validity of first impressions is the mainstay of our "interviews." It inspires and sustains our august Public Service Commissions. How often the appointment of a clerk no less than that of a gazetted officer is determined by such felicitous accidents as a conjunction of dress and address or a timely visitation of what they call wit. Just one authentic flash of smartness and you please, insinuate, win. On the other hand let there be one awkward gesture, one wave of embarrassment, one look of confusion, and it is all over with you. Your fate is sealed once and for all.

Not only the appointment of personnel but even the choice of friends is sometimes dictated by first impressions. It is not always merit that "wins the soul." Charms that strike the sight sometimes strike the soul too. Men have often fallen in love in this way. The oft-quoted line, "Who ever lov'd, that lov'd not at first sight," is a glowing tribute to the power of the first impression in this field.

However, the reign of first impressions extends further than that. Even the wisest and shrewdest brains can catch the infection. Under its influence, great writers have sometimes shown extreme injustice and hostility to their worthy contemporaries. We recall the unhappy meeting of Carlyle and Charles Lamb. How the latter — the best friend mankind ever had — came to be denounced and disparaged by Carlyle. And the misunderstanding arose out of a most trivial circumstance — the mere accident of a first impression. Poor Lamb could not manage to be as sober at the time as Carlyle would have him. Lamb the author was for the time being pleased to enact Lamb — the frolic and the gay abandon of his jokes was enough to damn him for ever in the eyes of the prophet who was made for anything but a joke.

The great critic William Hazlitt has somewhere confessed that he "loved mankind in the abstract but hated men in particular." Hazlitt dwelt habitually in a realm of metaphysical perfection and he could not help reacting violently to human imperfections — often letting the first impression loom large and tyrannize over all his subsequent judgements on the subject. We are reminded of his apathy towards Keats. Haydon, his friend, has traced this wilful perversity of Hazlitt to his excessive self-love.

There it is then. The first impression need not be authentic. We put our faith wholly and solely in the easy evidence of our senses and refuse to delve deeper. We equate a man's character with his behaviour. Instinct, after all, is more powerful than Reason. Truth is cold; opinions are warm. Knowledge seems to dull the edge of pleasure — the pleasure of hating.

We cannot hate a person whom we know and understand.

The inordinate sway a first impression often has over us may be due to our being too sure of ourselves. It may proceed from self-love or vanity or, worse still, from an over-meticulous, exacting nature. Lastly, it may spring straight from our worldly experience. Whatever the source may be, the results are seldom found to be salutary. Deceptions and disillusionments too often follow our comfortable conclusions. All that glitters is not gold, nor all that does not, mere dross. Men are not what they appear on the surface. Philosophers may flirt at times; poets may indulge in the most unpoetic whims; and saints may lose their serenity over trifles. Consistency is not always the strong point even of the strongest of men.

There is, no doubt, something to be said for the proverb when one considers it from an aesthetic standpoint. Some of the best poems in the world had their genesis in a first impression. Even the lazier art of fiction and essay may at times recognize the principle. Art, it is true, moves us in proportion as it succeeds in removing the film of familiarity from our eyes and making us look at things as if we saw them for the first time. With an artist, therefore, a first impression may sometimes easily and justly acquire the validity of the last impression, though even here we cannot afford to ignore the warning of Wordsworth, who preferred "Emotion recollected in tranquillity" to the first sense and suggestion of a thing. We have also to consider whether the example of artists is always a safe one to follow for the generality of men. Artistic temperament may have its dangers no less than its charms.

Granted, then, that the proverb "The first impression is the last impression" is not without its aesthetic justification, we may, nevertheless, pause to consider its relation to the humbler planes of reality. We have already seen the futility of judging men from their first appearance. Our experience tells us that there are people born with certain unfortunate dispositions and difficulties of temperament which are beyond their conscious control; yet they are sociable creatures deep within. To rely on a first impression, then, would be unfair to them. Tact and sympathetic effort to understand on our part will naturally go a long way in bringing out their true selves.

Then there are the tender-minded, sensitive type of men who are extremely shy of utterance. They may be — often they are — actually endowed with acute intelligence and uncommon parts, but somehow they get confused in society and begin to act and speak as they never would in their self-confident moments. Like Goldsmith and Gray, they are incapable of being themselves in company. Shall we then — the self-appointed judges of the proverb — dismiss these persons at once as haughty, conceited, or muddle-headed? Is it not quite likely, if we do so, that in our

rashness we might be depriving ourselves of some very valuable friendships?

The mistake here is to take it for granted that human nature is all of a piece. Nothing could be farther from the truth. The most fatal flaws sometimes are found lurking in the noblest natures. Nor do we act wisely in being carried away by surface attractions. For "one may smile, and smile, and be a villain."

Doubtless there are men in this world who have no such secret reserves in them, but are fundamentally and frankly superficial. Either from total want of reticence or from being too conscious of their poverty, they are compelled to exhibit and empty themselves before any and everybody. No part of their personality — an open page — is impenetrable to your scrutinizing gaze. Here is a character before you which is incapable of any evaluation or development and about which your first impression will, of necessity, be the last impression.

Well, it is quite possible that in such a case you will continue to be right and nothing will happen to disturb your complacence for months together. But you need not be too sure. Sooner or later there is bound to emerge a shade which may alter the whole picture. For the ways of human nature are unpredictable even as are the ways of God. A person may be insufferably indecent without knowing himself to be so; another, baulked by fate or circumstances, may for ever remain a stranger to the best in him. Both are capable of being "touched to finer issues," by a favourable turn of time and tide. You can never tell.

And he who is absolutely certain of the infallibility of first impressions will still do well to ask himself: "Is my judgement and my application of the rule as infallible as the rule itself?" The rule itself is impersonal; not so my impression. The first impression may well be the last impression. But the question is whose first impression? What if there is something wrong with my very sensitiveness to impressions? Is it not possible that I might have been looking only for bad impressions?

So if we are reluctant to throw away our dear old maxim, let us at least modify it somewhat. For all that has been said or implied above against the proverb, the fact still remains that the first impression of a wise man can go far sometimes. Let those of us who are sure of the infallibility of their godlike wisdom apply their golden maxim as often as they wish. Few indeed can make pretension to such a wisdom. Most of us, as a matter of fact, should abjure the practice altogether. Well might we imagine ourselves to be shrewd and penetrating enough to judge others at the first glance. But the fact is that we are only erecting a private preference into an absolute standard. Poor vaunt of men indeed to arrogate such omniscient authority to their weak, erring selves.

Let us then, instead of shouting "A first impression is the last impression," content ourselves with the humbler belief that "A first impression is not always the last impression; nay, oftentimes it is not only not the last but the least impression."

RAMESH CHANDRA SHAH

GO ON WANDERING

Go ye, O Bhikkhus,
Go on and wander forth
For the gain of the many,
For the welfare of the many,
In compassion for the world,
For the good and for the gain,
For the welfare, of gods and men.

Proclaim, O Bhikkhus,
The Doctrine glorious,
Preach ye a life of holiness,
Perfect and pure.
Go on wandering, O Bhikkhus!

Rendered by SUJATA PRIYAMBADA
from the "*Mahavagga*," *Vinaya Pitaka*

NEW BOOKS AND OLD

A STUDY OF EDUCATIONAL HISTORY*

EDUCATION, PERSPECTIVE, AND HISTORY are the theme of this book. It is a world view of education from the watchtowers of history, taking in a grand panorama of society, dead, living, and enciente, to discover the ideal, meaning, method, and purpose of education in diverse civilizations, classified into the primary, equipped with an Apprentice Method with Oral Tradition; secondary, including the Sindic, Indic, and Hellenic civilizations; and tertiary, including the Far Eastern, Orthodox, Christian, Hindu, Islamic, and early Western civilizations. Even education in "abortive" and "arrested" civilizations comes within the purview of this study. The two concluding chapters bring the study to a focus with a general comparison of educational ideals and methods in nineteen civilizations of the world and with a set of broad conclusions drawn by the master hand of Dr. Arnold J. Toynbee.

Education has never been given such a world perspective, which is necessary for the One World that is painfully emerging. Diverse civilizations are screened to find out the characteristics of the different experiments in education that mankind has carried out. The comparisons it attempts are bold; its conclusions are cautious. It deals with massive facts and is refreshingly objecttive. It is idealistic and yet surprisingly free from dogma.

The broad conclusions drawn are:

(1) Education in the earliest civilizations meant the fullest development of the individual mind and spirit;

(2) As society became more complex, educational goals and methods became pragmatic;

(3) These pragmatic goals in the present technological society have almost overshadowed the other goals and aspects of education;

(4) Education in earlier civilizations was individual whereas in the present age education is social and collective; and

(5) Education is no longer confined to a limited few and the modern ideal is one of universal education.

The virtue of this great book is also its defect. It begins with the "Toynbee background" of history and ends with the "Toynbee conclusions." The result is that it becomes an appendix to Toynbee's *A Study of History*.

Toynbee's magnificent sweep of the meaning and content of history legitimately includes every conceivable aspiration of man. Necessarily it includes education, which is at once the basis and texture of civilizations. But Toynbee's search for patterns of civilization and their neat classification has its limitation. Civilizations are misunderstood when treated and labelled as patterns or categories. Education and its objective are certain to be misunderstood if forced into such patterns or categories, which necessarily overlook the real foundation and aspiration of education. Secondly, the challenge-response dichotomy of the Toynbee school of history affects that appraisement of education. Perhaps a truer view is that the challenge in the environment always exists but the capacity to respond depends not so much on the challenge itself as on that interior preparation which should always be the aim and object of education, irrespective of the pattern of civilization. Then, is challenge in the environment or in the mind? Modern civilization and modern education consciously and unconsciously have produced many devices to become deaf, dumb, blind, and insensitive. Challenge

* *Education in the Perspective of History.* By EDWARD D. MYERS. (Longmans, Green, and Company, London; Orient Longmans, Bombay. 388 pp. 1963. Rs. 24.00; 30*s*.)

and response are not separable categories.

Education as transmission of a cultural heritage in a broad sense has been criticized as an un-self-conscious and unorganized activity in the past. But should not all true education be such? A too self-conscious education defeats itself, as it is doing in the present age. Dr. Toynbee very significantly points out that one danger is to make education a burden on the mind, and in the act of making it formal we make it cumulative. The second danger of formalizing education is to make it esoteric. Missionary religions with new corporations of educated clerics to propagate them looked upon the human race as prospective converts, but in that very process they were unknowingly leading the way to universal education. The Industrial Revolution and technological advancement have disintegrated education.

One suggested conclusion, that the present need is for balancing education in natural science and technology with an education in the humanities, is insufficient, because the problem is much deeper than curricular. Therefore Dr. Toynbee's major conclusion comes as a refreshing breeze: "One lesson is that we must try to keep the several essential subjects of education in balance with each other. Undoubtedly the most important subject of all is man." Education now has thrown that man out of focus, and mere technological improvement will not recover for him his integrity. The quality of education in turn suffers by this want of integrity, a problem which the book describes as a paradox of the modern age.

The one conclusion which could have been drawn but is, curiously, not drawn in this book is that all true education in the last analysis in every civilization in human history carried the same eloquent message of improving the quality of man by training the right relationship between latency and patency, between nature and nurture, and between spirit and matter; and by maintaining the rhythm of the trinity between the teacher, the taught, and the training. Modern education has broken that rhythm, in the name of technology. But technology is not so new a phenomenon. It was present in both historic and prehistoric civilizations although it was not called technology at that time. The peasant or the artisan of the proverbial age who learnt his job was in that sense a technological man but then the point is that this technology did not make him less a man. Today's does.

This study misses the universal features of education in its search for features, patterns, methods, and characteristics special to countries and times. Modern confusion mistakes mass education for universal education. Education cannot be a mass product and the attempt to make it such is the root of the disruption of the relationship between the teacher, the taught, and the curriculum. Education at its core remains an individual process. But there is a solution which can make the individual process universal, so that universal education may become a realizable ideal and not a curiosity of Victorian social thinking. The universality of the essential purposes and methods of education one looks for in vain in this otherwise magnificent book.

P. B. MUKHARJI

The Gītā and Indian Culture. By H. H. SHRI-JAYA-CHAMARAJA WADIYAR. (Orient Longmans, Bombay. 68 pp. 1963. Rs. 3.00; popular ed. Rs. 2.00)

The urge which serious thinkers in India, in every generation, have felt to relate their own thought to the teachings of the *Gītā* testifies to the central position the *Gītā* holds in Indian culture, as also to the distinguishing character of that culture. This little book bears luminous witness to this deep-seated urge to come to terms with the *Gītā*. Of the two essays which make it up, the first deals with the context and general bearings of the *Gītā*. It is based

mainly on the second *adhyāya* and serves as an excellent introduction to the *Gītā*.

The other essay starts with a discussion of the idea of culture, citing Matthew Arnold and Clive Bell, and explains the peculiarly Indian point of view with the help of two lengthy extracts, one from Max Müller and the other from Sir John Woodroffe. This essay has special reference to the distinction between *Kshetra* and *Kshetrajña* (body and soul?) drawn in the thirteenth *adhyāya* of the *Gītā*, and makes this knowledge crucial for the understanding of the uniquely Indian concept of *Dharma*, which is here depicted as forming the inmost core of our culture, and as "woven into a pattern of our life in society." At the same time, the following is stressed:

> The one concept of *dharma* that is indeed supreme is the complete devotion to the Lord. All other loyalties are superseded in this highest of all loyalties, the loyalty to the Highest within one. The whole teaching of the *Gita* supports and substantiates this position. This devotion is what is called *dharma* in the *adhyatmic* sense.

The presentation is on comparatively familiar lines, and there is considerable overlapping of ideas, and even some small inconsistencies appear. But this is not a purely intellectual or scholastic exercise. I might repeat here what I wrote in reviewing the distinguished author's earlier and larger work, *Dattātreya* (in the *Quarterly Journal of the Mythic Society*, January 1959):

> Reading through the book, the sincere student will be impressed by the selfless fervour which actuates the author, and will share the illuminating vision which inspires him to compose this work.

The general approach is on *Advaitic* lines as expounded by Śaṃkara. In all humility, the author declares, "I have been brought to experience reality closer through his system than through any other." Repeated references to the *Avadhūta Gītā* also disclose the continuation of the allied direction of thought which found expression in *Dattātreya*. We may conclude with the remarks of Dr. Radhakrishnan in his highly commendatory Introduction to that book, which are relevant in the present connection also: that it simultaneously reveals "his vast learning and deep devotion" and that the author is "not merely a theoretical student but a practising disciple, a *Sādhaka*."

K. Guru Dutt

Śankara's *Bhaja Govindam* (vi+72 pp. Rs. 2.00); Śankara's *Hymn to Śiva* (*Śivānandalaharī*) (xv+132 pp. Rs. 4.00): Sanskrit Texts with English Translations and Commentaries by T. M. P. Mahadevan. (Jayanti Series, Nos. 7 and 8 respectively. Ganesh and Company, Madras. 1962)

There is nothing incongruous in the author of the learned *bhāṣyas* (commentaries), written in sparkling prose, having composed devotional poems in scintillating verse so that the less learned might understand easily the fundamentals of the Vedāntic teaching. And Śaṅkara might have composed poems like these two, though it has to be admitted that these too have suffered interpolations. Tradition has it (p. 1) that, out of the thirty-one verses of the *Bhaja Govindam*, only twelve were composed by Śaṅkara himself. So also Verses 23 and 99 of the *Śivānandalaharī* may have been interpolated later, for it is difficult to imagine a devotee of both Śiva and Viṣṇu like Śaṅkara belittling one God while eulogizing the other. These are, however, problems which do not interest the devotee for whom the books are primarily intended.

The text given now of both these popular poems is the same as in the *Śāṅkaragranthāvalī* (Vols. 17, 18) series, Srirangam. To this Professor Mahadevan has added his very readable English translation and expository notes. The Introduction gives details about the hymns. It may be mentioned here perhaps that the first of these hymns is also called *Carpaṭapajjhaṭikā* in view

of its metre.

A lovely picture of the adored deity adorns each frontispiece. A few misprints need to be corrected in the next edition of these poems, which, we may hope, will be in demand before long.

H. G. NARAHARI

Lexicographical Studies in Jaina Sanskrit. By B. J. SANDESARA and J. P. THAKER. (The M.S. University Oriental Series, No. 5. Oriental Institute, Baroda. 241 pp. 1962. Rs. 12.00)

These studies, we are told, were published originally in the *Journal of the Oriental Institute.* They comprise four articles, covering three separate glossaries, one culled from the *Prabandhacintāmaṇi* of Merutuṅga, the second from the *Prabandhakośa* of Rājaśekhara, and the third from *Purātanaprabandhasaṅgraha,* with the addition of Addenda and Corrigenda at the end.

It would have been far more desirable to commingle the three glossaries into one so as to make it appear as one running dictionary. The compilers, however, have merely presented the four reprints bound together in book form.

The importance of the work is, however, very great indeed, especially at the present juncture when so many learned societies in India as well as various governmental departments both in the States and at the Centre are busy coining and collecting technical, scientific, and administrative terms to enrich regional languages as also to amplify Hindi. And it is Sanskrit works of the medieval and later periods, such as those by Jaina authors of Western India, three of which are taken into account in this work, that supply us with hundreds and thousands of ready-made and approporiate terms for which an elaborate search at much expense is going on in various societies and departments. Most of the searchers there are not well versed in Sanskrit, and rich sources like the works indicated above as well as thousands of old inscriptions remain out of their ken. Compilations like the present one will be a godsend to them.

Explaining many unfamiliar terms, our compilers compare them with their current equivalents in Gujarati, Marathi, and Hindi. It may be pointed out that another rich source of this type is Panjabi. In fact many terms, the true import of which is not clear from any other current language or dialect of India, are explained by Panjabi. Take, for instance, the word *kahala* (p. 120). Its meaning as "impatient" or "one in haste" is very common in Panjabi, but not so in other speeches. Our compilers waver in settling its true import and are wide of the mark.

More, and more-co-ordinated, research on the lines indicated by the studies of our authors is needed. They are to be congratulated on their initiative.

B. CH. CHHABRA

Tolerance: A Study from Buddhist Sources. By PHRA KHANTIPALO. (Rider and Company, London, 191 pp. 1964. 25*s*.)

The author of this book is a convert to Theravada Buddhism and now a Bhikku in Thailand. As a study in the Buddhism of Ceylon and Thailand and its ethical results, the work can be recommended under the heading of Comparative Religion. There is nothing very new in the book, but it should gain new readers who know little of Buddhism — making the work itself new. It is not likely to make many converts in the West, where Theistic religion, if any at all, prevails. But arousing the general interest in how other races interpret Life, differently from Christianity and Islam, and even Hinduism, is all to the good.

A very significant fact admitted by the writer is the hostility between Communism and Buddhism, both being

atheistic and both denying personal immortality. One would suggest that the hostility is partly due to the strange fact that there is a pessimism in the very structure of Buddhism which is alien to a world made new through revolution and quantities of bloodshed and destruction — whereas in monastic Buddhism (at least) you only get "pie" when you cease to exist as a "self" in this world or another. At the same time, a level-minded atheist of the West would see no great cause to take on another religious system after discarding any one of the systems belonging to Western Theism.

But this work, which ought to find its way into many if not most of the public libraries of the world, is of value for the second-rate student, and the not-so-deep student, repelled by weightier tomes which are not written so agreeably.

E. V. HAYES

St. Francis of Assisi: The Bhakti Yogin. By ANTHONY ELENJIMITTAM. (Aquinas Publications, Bombay. 141 pp. 1963.)

During a visit to Assisi, it was suggested to the Rev. Shri Elenjimittam that he should write on the life and philosophy of St. Francis from an Indian point of view. The author feels that, of all the saints in the Catholic hierarchy, this gentle son of God appeals most to the Oriental mind and heart, for his universal love transcended the bournes of all religions.

This book is a sincere attempt to "build a bridge" between the religious heritage of the West and the East, and stress is laid on the basic unity of all faiths. Many comparisons are drawn between the preaching and precepts of the Poverello (as he was lovingly referred to by the Assisians) and the *bhakti-yogins* and *sanyasins* of India. The author also points out the resemblance between the thousands of consecrated men and women, who in the Roman Catholic as well as the Buddhist faith, devote their lives, as monks and nuns, to the service of God.

The natural beauties of the enchanting town of Assisi played a great part in moulding the character of St. Francis, who preached his sermons not only to his fellow men but also to the birds and fishes.

To endure the cruellest suffering for the sake of God was summarized as Perfect Joy by St. Francis, and in this connection a Buddhist anecdote is given illustrating the similarity between the two creeds.

Hagiographic history presents two types of saints, those born saintly and those who are converted to saintliness. St. Francis, who belongs to the second category, freed himself very early in life from all worldly desires, and it can truly be said of him that though "born of man, he was re-born of God."

ROSHAN KOTHAWALA

More Tales from the Masnavi. By A. J. ARBERRY. (George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., London. 252 pp. 1963. 28*s*.)

This volume, as the title indicates, is essentially the second part of a collection of stories in translation from the long poem of Jalal ud-Din Rumi (d. (1273) on the mystical life. The appended notes are helpful on points of detail, but a proper appreciation of the work presupposes some knowledge of the author and his teaching, such as is given by the translator's introduction to the earlier volume, *Tales from the Masnavi.* Nevertheless, even taken by themselves, the stories have much to convey to anyone familiar with the ways in which Muslim mystics employ allegories. Some will provide food for many hours of meditation.

The stories come from various fields. There are incidents from the Qur'an expanded to point a lesson. There are tales from Islamic history, and tales of the early Sūfīs. Above all there are many of the amusing anonymous anecdotes which are found wide-spread in the Middle East. Not a few may be

read simply as stories, and, as such, communicate something of the flavour of Muslim society and give insight into various aspects of its inner life. The translation has all the smoothness and felicity which has come to be expected of Professor Arberry, and is eminently readable.

It is to be hoped that the translator will in due course be able to publish the third volume which he speaks of in the Introduction. This is to be a methodically arranged selection of doctrinal passages from the *Masnavi*. Such a trilogy will make it possible for the English reader to enter much more fully into the teaching of Rumi.

W. MONTGOMERY WATT

The Liberal Mind. By K. R. MINOGUE. (Methuen and Company, Ltd., London. 206 pp. 1963. 30*s*.)

This book deals with liberalism as a philosophy and not as the tenet of a particular political party. Ideological batttle has died down: no one now contests the principles which liberalism has propounded from the beginning.

The author, who is a lecturer in political science at that stronghold of liberalism, the London School of Economics, delves deeply into the principles involved by examining their motives and their implications. He is not concerned solely with the political aspects, such as the democratic machinery of government — an uncontrolled press, responsible opposition parties, freedom from arbitrary arrest, and so on — he is concerned to show liberalism as a moral force. Liberals dislike the use of force to settle disputes and they dislike intense nationalism. Liberalism is thus an attitude of mind.

It is intended that one result of liberalism should be prosperity; for the energies of the people will be released from the varied oppressions of the past. Another result is political stability; for discontent is not forced underground where it may foment rebellion.

What is distinctive of modern liberalism is a new understanding of politics — we evolve from feudalism and ecclesiastical power to more intelligent forms of government without violent revolution. Thus liberalism becomes a technique of government, a concept that is examined critically in this book (pp. 5-6, 90-102). To depend on the social conscience to remedy an evil is not sufficient: We have evolved a mechanism, acting through the legal system, to make our consciences go into action.

In these circumstances it is difficult to agree with the author that here are no more big dragons to kill; not, at least, in the West. Therefore we cannot escape the responsibility which is ours while the freedoms of the preamble to the Charter of the United Nations remain unaccomplished. More important than any other, this is a field that is liberalism's very own.

The Liberal Mind sets out to attempt to uncover the philosophy of liberalism and to lay bare its implications. It must be conceded that it largely does do this, and the author is to be complimented on a real *tour de force*. It is a fine book, well written, and should have an honoured place in every intelligent man's library.

L. DELGADO

The States of Human Consciousness. By C. DALY KING. Foreword by ROY FINCH. (University Books, New York. xiii+176 pp. 1963. $7.50)

Mr. Roy Finch contributes a foreword to this book describing the author, and this is of great importance to readers. It is of importance because the character of an author inevitably finds expression in his description of different states of consciousness. Dr. King is a scientist, psychologist, and philosopher, and he has previously written books on all of these subjects. Roy Finch regards him as being primarily a scientist, who has "never ceased to be a skeptical investigator, firmly committed to the methods of science, and ever doubting

what could not be established by experiment and logical proof." Equally important is the fact that Dr. King met two men who had a very strong influence on him. The first of these men was Orage, the Editor of the *New Age*, and the second Gurdjieff, a Russian mystic who had many followers in New York. Dr. King wrote of the latter that he was the most remarkable person he had ever met. He eventually became one of Gurdjieff's many followers.

In his book on consciousness Dr. Daly King accepts Gurdjieff's statement that there are five levels of consciousness possible to man: the level of deep sleep associated with dreams; that of dreamless sleep; the state in which we spend most of the day; true self-consciousness or awareness; a very rare supra-normal level of objective consciousness known as Cosmic Consciousness. In the early chapters of his book Dr. King describes these various levels of consciousness and he writes particularly clearly about the three lowest levels. He also gives an excellent scientific analysis of these lower levels but he utterly fails to convey to his readers any of the features of the two highest levels of consciousness, namely that of a stirring in our habitual semi-consciousness of everyday life, and that highest state of all, known as Cosmic Consciousness. It may be true that he himself has never experienced this highest level, but Gurdjieff taught his pupils a great deal about moments of greater awareness in their day-time level of consciousness. Gurdjieff also taught them methods of attaining a momentary increase of their day-time self-awareness. Yet I can find no clear evidence in Dr. King's book that he has experimented with Gurdjieff's methods or has obtained any positive results from them!

The author's failure to describe his own efforts to obtain higher levels of consciousness is the chief weakness of this book. In striking contrast to this failure is Dr. King's exposition of the physiological changes occurring on different levels of consciousness. His descriptions of the physiological changes taking place in the body during sleep and wakefulness are excellent. It is only Dr. King's *psychological* descriptions of these higher states that are deficient.

KENNETH WALKER

Apparitions and Precognition: A Study from the Point of View of C. G. Jung's Analytical Psychology. By. ANIELA JAFFE. Foreword by C. G. JUNG. (University Books, New York. x+214 pp. 1963. $7.50)

The author presents many matters of extreme interest to the modern world, both East and West. Not only does Mrs. Jaffé give a very lucid and impartial account of many supersensory experiences, interpreting them in accordance with the psychology of C. G. Jung, and drawing on the parapsychological experiments of J. B. Rhine, but she also shows how Jung's view of the freedom of the human will comes very close to that of the Vedantic tradition (as referred to in my article "The Vedanta and Jungian Psychology," which appears elsewhere in this journal). Concerning this, Mrs. Jaffé writes:

> Man is neither free nor capable of executing his ego-will against the higher power of his own destiny. But the experiences also show that there is a human freedom, when it is conceived of in a quite different sense, namely as a moral problem or a question of consciousness.

Furthermore a close affinity is revealed between the Vedantic view of the universe and certain of the Western sciences. The concluding paragraph has this to say:

> Jung's approach has an advantage over these two schools of psychology [Freud and Adler] because the concept of the "archetype" introduces a paradoxical viewpoint that does justice both to the psychical and to the physical realm and takes into consideration the acausality of borderline events. We have mentioned in passing that this approach shows significant parallels with atomic physics. The psychic and physical are no

longer fundamentally separate, but emerge as two different aspects of the same background reality.

The author shows how the psychology of Jung and parapsychology have the function of acting as a bridge between the psychic and the physical, and that as a result of their research they are able to offer concrete evidence of the unitary nature of the world.

EDWARD THORNTON

Sanskrit Poetics as a Study of Aesthetic. By S. K. DE. With Notes by EDWIN GEROW. (The University of California; Oxford University Press, Bombay. 118 pp. 1963. Rs. 15.00)

The work under review, so well printed and produced in America, gives us in book form the inaugural Tagore Memorial Lectures delivered by Dr. De, the doyen of Sanskrit poetics, at the University of Chicago in October 1961. I took up the work with great expectations of finding new matter and new thinking on the subject by one who is admittedly the highest authority today in this country, and was most unprepared for the disappointment in store for me. The whole material now issued in book form had appeared in print as early as 1936 — in the *Dacca University Studies*, Vol. I, No. 2 — under the same title; and had been reissued in 1959 under the title "The Problem of Poetic Expression" in the volume *Some Problems of Sanskrit Poetics* (Firma K. C. Mukhopadhyaya, Calcutta). These lectures were delivered once at the Annamalai University in 1935, and then again at the Bombay University in 1943. I had occasion to write an article in Vol. XIII, Nos. 3-4, of *The Poona Orientalist* purporting to show that Dr. De's conclusion in the said monograph or "lecture" about Sanskrit poetics, viz., "It is like studying the index of a book rather than the book itself," was unfair. I am therefore very happy to note the replacement of this last sentence now by the following:

> Nevertheless, the aberrations are at the same time attempts to reach the truth; and in the midst of unlifted shadows one does often perceive a running thread of silver lining (p. 79).

Though, except for very minor changes, the material remains the same, there is no denying the abiding value of the work or the masterly *critique* it gives, in the short span of seventy-nine pages, of practically every concept of Sanskrit poetics — *Alaṃkāra, Guṇa, Rīti, Rasa, Vakrokti, Dhvani, Pāka,* and *Śayyā*. The publishers deserve every praise for having brought this excellent survey within the reach of a wider circle of readers.

Dr. De not only explains but explores the different Sanskrit concepts from the point of view of modern aesthetics; and he finds them deficient on one count or another. He is critical almost to a fault, and perhaps it was necessary to be, as a corrective to the chauvinistic trend in vogue. Yet one would wish Dr. De had attempted an exposition of positive aesthetics that could bring about an integration in the formal categories reviewed.

We are all praise for the illuminating Notes (pp. 79-112) contributed by Edwin Gerow, which give every aid to the reader who does not know Sanskrit to follow the text intelligently. Some slips in diacritical marking are noticed; and there are even downright errors. On p. 86 *abhidhānā* should be *abhidhāna* and *vācanā* (there is no such word in Sanskrit) should be *vācakatva*. On p. 108, the translation of *diasam paloehi* should have been "Have a look when there is daylight yet," not "How late the day has become!"

K. KRISHNAMOORTHY

Keats-Shelley Memorial Bulletin No. XIII. Edited by DOROTHY HEWLETT. (Longfield Cottage, Sheen Common, London. viii+47 pp. 1962. 9*s*. 6*d*.)

The Romantics are with us always. Although we hear off and on that this

or that Romantic has suffered — like Milton — decisive "dislodgement," on a second look we find that this is not so at all. English literature without these poets of the "Renaissance of Wonder" is almost unthinkable. Matthew Arnold, of course, wrote to Clough as long ago as 1852: "Keats and Shelley were on a false track when they set themselves to reproduce the exuberance of expression, the charm, the richness of images, and the felicity, of the Elizabethan poets." But even Arnold did not say that the Romantics were only imitators. In their creative forge, imitation itself somehow led to rare originality. There is thus ample justification for publications like those of the Keats-Shelley Memorial Association.

The present number concentrates on certain biographical problems. Katharine M. R. Kenyon's note on the possible engagement of Keats and Fanny Brawne on 1 May 1819 (and not on 25 December 1818) is an interesting piece of literary detection. The poem written on bits of paper in the garden on 30 April was the "Ode to Psyche" not the "Ode to the Nightingale," which was surely "composed when hope had worked so strongly in his heart that he believed his love was returned." When Keats knew on 1 May that his love was requited, he completed the "Nightingale" Ode and followed it with the "other marvellous Ode, *On the Grecian Urn*." We are indeed grateful for any new light thrown on the life of "young, ill-fated, most marvellous and best-loved of the English poets." Among other interesting contributions are F. N. Doubleday's "John Keats and the Borough Hospitals," Jean Haynes's note on Keats's grandfather, and Phyllis G. Mann's on Keats's reading.

Shelley too receives attention in the bulletin. Desmond King-Hele's note on "The Influence of Erasmus Darwin on Shelley" shows how the poet, being drawn to the botanist's theories, incorporated some of them in *Queen Mab* and *Prometheus Unbound*:

> Shelley's finest lyrics probably owe something to Darwin too. For Darwin particularly liked describing aerial phenomena, a taste shared by Shelley, whose most famous lyrics, the *West Wind*, the *Cloud* and the *Skylark*, are set in the sky. . . . Finally, Shelley's *Sensitive Plant*, with its continuous personification of plants and its flower-catalogue, is obviously inspired by (Darwin's) *The Loves of the Plants*.

Mention must also be made of the fine frontispiece — the coloured portrait of Elizabeth Shelley, who is said to have resembled the poet her brother "as strikingly as if they had been twins."

K. R. Srinivasa Iyengar

Music in the Life of Man. By Julius Portnoy. (Holt, Rinehart and Winston, London. xx+300 pp. Illustrated. 1963. 24*s*.)

In what is really a labour of love as well as the fruit of strenuous research, Mr. Julius Portnoy has produced a book of great value. It seems to me that the author was able to collect almost everything that has been said or written on music through the ages. The ease with which he quotes from the ancient philosophers and the most contemporary pronouncements is astounding. While his study is not primarily addressed to the musician or student of music, it has a direct bearing on the approach to musical creativeness by men in different walks of life. His aim is a profound one, his task of enormous dimensions.

Every now and again we come across details which call for further discussion or at any rate elucidation. He says: "Music helps us work off destructive impulses which we might otherwise turn inward upon ourselves or direct outward against our neighbours. . . ." Such argument needs proof, for it asserts that everybody should seek the help of music whether one likes music or not in order to work off destructive impulses; furthermore, this excludes deaf people. Fortunately there are few assertions of this kind.

The book contains a wealth of information. Not only does it show the

different approaches to music of a variety of people but the changes which have occurred in our attitudes towards this gentle and most noble art throughout the ages. The second chapter of the book, the elements of music, written in most general terms, proves beyond doubt that this book was primarily intended for those who are interested in music but whose theoretical equipment is rather poor.

We know only too well that we live in an era of theorizing run wild. The intellect is called upon to play the dominant part in our everyday life. I sincerely hope this book will be widely read and will assist people in a better understanding of music performed, for music to be appreciated must be heard and listened to. It is the Muse's fundamental and primary aim.

CZESLAW RAYMUND HALSKI

Education and the Training of Teachers. By P. GURREY. (Longmans, Green, and Company, London; Orient Longmans, Bombay. 160 pp. 1963. 13*s*. 6*d*.)

The author is so full of his subject — the qualifications of a teacher — that any student who intends to choose the career will feel overwhelmed by all that is expected of him. But Dr. Gurrey is a wise guide and intensely practical. After three introductory chapters on the teaching profession and the aims and content of education, he plunges into his main thesis of the training of teachers, and lists the various factors that convert a plodding professional into a competent personality, by the acquisition of responsibility, knowledge, experience, expression, and appreciation. The different activities which teachers should undertake to bring themselves into close contact with their pupils, to widen their interests and judgement, to enrich their personalities, are competently expounded. The development of character, the evocation of a capacity to make use of their knowledge in order to develop their mental powers, and the pursuit of higher values and their constant impingement on the day-to-day life of a teacher are also clearly brought out.

In what is perhaps the best chapter of the book, entitled "The Future Is the Teacher's," Dr. Gurrey rightly points out that the danger of getting into a rut and becoming an object of amused pity which clogs the profession can be effectively overcome if the teacher retains initiative and makes his routine of duties an opportunity to widen and deepen his sympathies, to quicken his understanding, and to gain detachment from self; because then contact with quick, lively minds, bursting with curiosity and interest, will be invigorating and will call forth the best in the teacher and enable him to become a better person. With the growth of wisdom and skill the teacher inevitably expands in spirit. Above all the joy of arousing the creative powers of the mind is an exhilaration which has few equals in life.

The author closes his book with these three memorable truths for every teacher: "that work carried out with love and devotion has a higher and more permanent interest"; that "nothing of any value can be achieved except by unremitting labour"; and, finally, "men are led by serving them."

D. GURUMURTI

Telling the UN Story: New Approaches to Teaching about the United Nations and Its Related Agencies. By LEONARD S. KENWORTHY. (UNESCO, Paris. 166 pp. 1963. 6*s*., 4.50F.; $2.00)

Giant strides have been made in recent years in extending teaching about the United Nations and its related agencies throughout the world. Leonard Kenworthy, Professor of Education at Brooklyn College, City University of New York, however, thinks that educators in many countries cannot yet claim to have reached a majority of children and young people and the millions of adults everywhere with a sufficiently deep knowledge of them. Indeed, according to him, the surface of

this rather new and immensely important task of educating about the UN has scarcely been scratched and much remains to be achieved still.

Professor Kenworthy's book is designed to serve as a guide for teachers engaged in this task at all levels of education. While making the aims of teaching about the UN and its related agencies clearer, the author makes a close analysis of the common weaknesses to be met with in its actual practice and offers a host of practical suggestions to improve such teaching. He advocates special methods to teach students of different age-groups, utilizing the findings of the latest research on the learning process. He rightly points out further that the responsibility of translating the aims of the UN into action rests a good deal more on well-trained individual teachers than on the efforts of the Ministries and the governmental agencies who have taken up this task.

In the eighteen years of its functioning the UN with its related agencies has evolved into what is perhaps the greatest single moral force in the world and continues as an expression of the highest ideals of people everywhere. One is bound to conclude after studying Professor Kenworthy's booklet that only at great cost to their own respective countries can educators over the world afford not to recognize that fact sufficiently well.

B. G. RAMACHANDRA RAO

Temples and Legends of Maharashtra. By M. S. MATE. (240 pp.); *Temples and Legends of Andhra Pradesh.* By N. RAMESAN. (179 pp.) (Bhavan's Book University, Nos. 97 and 98, respectively. Both illustrated. 1962. Rs. 2.00; 3*s.* 6*d.*; 90 cents each)

It was a happy idea of the Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan to bring out a series of compact books which reveals the "deeper impulsion of India." But that will not prevent currents of world thought from refreshing its readers, as the Bhavan's motto is the Ṛgvedic "Let noble thoughts come to us from every side."

The Temples and Legends of Maharashtra introduces one to the religious centres of the region. The author has painstakingly amassed information on these and has written about them with almost the zeal of a preacher. In addition to a map and some plates — it is a pity that Plate No. 10 has been printed upside down — he provides sensibly a bibliography and an index.

The Temples and Legends of Andhra Pradesh contains a detailed account of the famous temples that are strewn over Andhra Pradesh. A map indicating the location of these gives it a slightly guide-book touch, while a sketch of the site of Shri-Shailam and minute details about architectural points lend it an archaeological grace. The extent of scholarship and its variety is really amazing, but for the common reader out for a spot of armchair sight-seeing all this plethora of information may be a little too overwhelming.

Both books will be of interest to archaeologists and students of temple architecture.

DILIP KUMAR SEN

Colonists and Foreign Missionaries of Ancient India. By P. THOMAS. (Joseph Thomasons and Co., Ernakulam. 83 pp. 1963. Rs. 5.00)

"When Europeans first came to India," says the author,

> they found the Hindus a stay-at-home people particularly lacking in a spirit of adventure. The Brahmins considered India the best of all possible lands, and other countries were reckoned unclean and unfit for Brahmins to live in. Travel abroad was taboo and the sea-voyage a major offence which brought, as punishment, immediate excommunication. All this naturally led the Portuguese and other Europeans . . . to conclude that the Hindus throughout their history had strictly confined their activities to India, and that

the sea was an element they feared and hated.

That this was far from being so was later revealed by Indologists, who proved that the ancient Hindus were among the most courageous of Asiatic seafarers who established cultural and colonial dominion over territory which stretched from India to Indo-China, and included in its wide sweep the Malay Peninsula, Java, Sumatra, Borneo, Bali, and other islands of the south.

The book provides biographical sketches of these missionaries, colonists, and adventurers who carried their religious traditions and beliefs far beyond their native land. The history of some of these inspired wanderers is inextricably but picturesquely mixed up with legend but there is much historical evidence, which Shri Thomas marshals carefully, in support of the others. Beginning with Vijaya, the conqueror of Ceylon, the book concerns itself with Sanghamitra, "the first woman foreign missionary in world history," Kaundinya, to whom South-east Asia owes the beginnings of her civilization. Padmasambhava, who brought Lamaism to Tibet, Gunavarman, a monk from Kashmir who converted the people of Java and Sumatra to Buddhism, and Kasyapa Matanga, the first Indian missionary to China, whose rulers came to India to seek spiritual aid. Shri Thomas etches in the background, both cultural and psychological, which led to this quest very carefully and has made this the most interesting chapter in the book. Meant for the general reader as well as for the student of history, this volume makes an acceptable addition to the literature on the subject.

HILLA C. VAKEEL

LEAVES FROM A PARIS DIARY

[A DEFENDER of the French language and a French thinker are **Shri Baldoon Dhingra**'s theme this month.—ED.]

PROFESSOR ETIEMBLE of the Sorbonne is one of those deadly serious custodians of French language and culture. His *Parlez-vous Franglais?* is, according to *Le Monde*, "the most energetic, virulent and original defence and illustration of the French language that we have had since the sixteenth century."

Professor Etiemble, who conducts radio-instruction classes from the Sorbonne, spent six weeks writing the study, to warn his countrymen of the danger. The theme of the book is that French is becoming a bastardized language in which unspeakable words like "week-end," "snack-bar," "hot dog," "pin-up," "hockey," and a host more are current coinage. People use, unashamedly, words like "pullover," "grapefruit," "drinks," and "best-seller," and this is doing incalculable damage to the French language. Fortunately, the Professor goes on to say that General de Gaulle, who only occasionally lapses into "Franglais," resists the invasion of the dollar and comes near to restoring and maintaining the sanctity of the French language.

If we do not take care now, Professor Etiemble insists, in forty years from now the French language will have ceased to exist. We swallow American words by the thousand; they enter completely raw into our own language — God knows with what uncertain pronunciation, with what grammatical freedom (especially in the formation of the plurals)! These excesses drive one to the wall — but we even make up false English words. (This I know is too true. For instance, a common expression now in use, for a stroll or a walk, is "footing.") And then, Professor Etiemble goes on to say, we distort the real meaning of our words. We do not respect our rules of composition any more; we distort our syntax. In short we do not speak French any more — we speak an

Atlantic "Franglais."

The Académie Française has reached the letter C, and in fact, reached the word "civilization," which word coincides happily with President Segni's visit to Paris. Thus the grand project of a revision of the French dictionary is making headway. Each word is given a careful discussion and surveillance of protracted nuance to ensure its *pureté* and define not only its meaning but its *bona-fides* as worthy of a *rôle* in the French language. It goes without saying that any English Anglo-Saxon intrusions are not only instantly suspect but subjected to the most rigorous resistance. But there are certain words for which there is as yet no French equivalent. How about the word "penalty" in football or rugby? The French alternative is a mouthful: *coup de pied de reparation.*

But from one serious subject to another. For the question of language can become, as we well know in Europe (take Belgium), and in India, no laughing matter. But no-one can stop the use of words the young will use in everyday speech.

I have often talked about Teilhard to my very good friend, Dr. René Loriot, who, by the way, is the Founder-President of the Paris Branch of the World Congress of Faiths. Dr. Loriot has several hundred letters, unseen by most people, of Teilhard; for the two friends conducted over the years a long and uninterrupted correspondence.

Once I asked the Doctor to tell me what most really impressed him in Teilhard's thought.

> Why do you ask? [he said]. There is nothing Teilhard has said that is not to be found in the works of Indian sages, of men, say, like Aurobindo or Shivananda in recent years. On many occasions, I told Teilhard that his vision of the oneness of mankind, his cosmic approach to things, was essentially Oriental. But the Jesuit in Teilhard, the priest in him, resisted such comparisons. But in spite of himself his search for truth forced him to come to the same conclusions and made his outlook psychosomatic.

Hence, he said, Teilhard had come to reject the God who works from outside in favour of One who works in the totality of things. This coincides with Dr. Charles Raven's interpretation of Teilhard.

The other day I took Dr. Loriot to meet Dr. Charles Raven, whose book *Teilhard de Chardin: Scientist and Seer* we had both read. I had promised Dr. Raven when we met in Brussels last December that I would try to arrange such a meeting in February, and this seemed to come about, like all good things, easily. Dr. Raven and his wife were there to meet us and I listened as Drs. Loriot and Raven talked with earnestness but with great simplicity and feeling about Teilhard.

Dr. Raven has already expressed his misgivings, as Dr. Loriot has too, with those people who claim that Teilhard was primarily a Christian mystic, and only secondly, and importantly, a scientist. Some ask: Is this science? Then Dr. Raven goes on to make a remarkable statement which deserves to be quoted in full:

> And some of them appear to suppose that if they can show that it does not satisfy their definition of science then it can be dismissed as irrelevant, if not indeed as an impertinent invader of their sanctuary. Those of us who remember the twenty years of such treatment which kept the universities and many of the hospitals closed to psychiatry had thought that the attempt to confine science to the realm of physics, weights and measurements, had been abandoned when that struggle ended. . . . It is significant that many scientists, notably Dr. Medawar, feel that science consists solely of physics, chemistry, and mathematics, and that only these disciplines provide sound knowledge of nature.

And then Dr. Raven hits the nail squarely on the head when he calls this a relapse into the crude notion that a world of personal awareness and relationships can be ignored and that the vast ranges which we perhaps can never quite comprehend intellectually are of no account.

What is perhaps Teilhard's great contribution — and one for which French,

indeed European, thought must be grateful — is that he recognizes, both as scientist and as seer, other worlds which science fully recognizes but cannot yet prove. There is an inner reality which is perhaps just as "scientific" as any the world of "nature," as modern science conceives it, can show.

It seems extraordinary to many modern, especially Christian, thinkers that Teilhard opens for them avenues to a world which now even the Church has begun to sanction: the world of mystery in which all can share and play a part. It is a cosmic world, by some standards, and — horrified though some may be at the thought — a pagan world, of "withinness," and, as Teilhard himself once said, a world *plus sensible qu'intellectuelle.*

BALDOON DHINGRA

THE DREAMER'S EYE

The dreamer's eye beholds
A vision strange and clear,
A flash, the vision fades,
Remains then but the mere
Shadow of that joy
He sought to hold in vain,
And only its alloy
Teases the restless brain.

HERBERT BLUEN

ENDS AND SAYINGS

"... ends of verse
And sayings of philosophers."
—SAMUEL BUTLER: *Hudibras*

The quarterly *Hibbert Journal* (January 1964) contains three interesting "Studies in Education" by H. B. Miles, Lecturer in Education, University of Hull. The first deals with "Creative Science in School," the second with "Teaching World History," while the last takes up the question "Can We Teach Morality?" Mr. Miles considers three answers:

1. The conventional one is embodied in the H.M.S.O. Newsom Report, 1963, which advocates specific religious instruction, not treated as a literary or historical subject, but leading from present-day problems back to the Bible.

2. The Institute of Christian Education, in the editorial of its magazine, *Learning for Living* (November 1963) states that compulsory religious instruction produces hostile or indifferent classes. It would like to see specialist teachers of the subject discarded in favour of allowing the children to bring up questions about moral issues to anyone on the staff who is accessible, either in class (whatever the subject), or in private conversation. This, Mr. Miles points out, throws rather too much onus on the teachers, without giving guidance or material.

3. He asks for more books like *Tensions Our Children Live With,* edited by Dorothy F. Spoerle (Beacon Press, Boston). This consists of short conversations among a group of children who discuss what they ought to do when up againt certain everyday moral problems. These conversations are all left with open endings, and the class, also in discussion, has to work out the answers, some of which may be obvious, some not. In every case, the whole circumstances have to be carefully considered before the right action can be seen. In this way

> pupils would be brought unconsciously into contact with some of the deepest religious issues, like grace and forgiveness, but would have made the decisions their own ... it is thoughtful, personal decision that should be aimed at, not endoctrination, however enlightened.

It is indeed so; yet one might suggest, additionally — not as dogmatic or sectarian assertion — the presentation of fundamental and parallel ethical sayings from the great religions of the world (as done by the late Professor C. S. Lewis in his pamphlet *The Abolition of Man*). It would simply show how, in all ages, everywhere, people have declared the rightness of certain ethical attitudes, and indicate that such a universal criterion deserves examination.

Miss Muriel Lester whose long life of practical benevolence has made its impact in both East and West, was sent tributes from all over the world for her eightieth birthday last December. On 29 February 1964 she received the Freedom of the Borough of Poplar (in the East End of London), where she did such good work in earlier years. Betty Jerman, in an interview (*The Guardian,* 19 February 1964) brings out well the dedication of her life — the starting point with the invitation to the factory girls' club at Bow; the opening, with her sister, of the first nursery school in the area, then of a Children's House; and the building of Kingsley Hall, as a centre for adults, a centre in which the helpers themselves lived austerely (on an allowance of 6*s*. a week). In an interview about that time, with an ARYAN PATH representative (published January 1930) she said it was taken on as "fun," then became "duty," and finally "affection," something one could not do without. Her final words were:

If we separate ourselves from others, we lose our humility. Others teach us as much as we teach them.

As Alderman on Poplar Council she fought hard for humane treatment of the victims of abject poverty in the district, especially the mothers and children. It was she who persuaded Gandhi to visit London in the early thirties. For a further twenty years she was the travelling secretary of the Fellowship of Reconciliation, dedicated to Christian pacifism, a task that carried her round the world seven times, and even into prison twice, for her convictions.

Virtues that, left as abstractions, become merely words, when embodied in living examples like Muriel Lester, take on warmth and vitality. *The Guardian* deserves full measure of praise for making a special and continued feature of such valuable portraits — courage and resourcefulness in a polio patient; practical compassion in a couple who with small means create a home (in the real sense) for ex-prisoners; large-hearted understanding in foster-mothers of unwanted children; and so on. Such "profiles" not only light up the heart potentialities of others, but help to sweeten the vile and bitter taste left by many items of so-called "news-value" in the press generally.

The Continental and British Press have been showing interest in Russian press reports of girls with "skin vision," reports that are paralleled by similar ones from America. The Russian cases are vouched for by physicist academician Boris Konstantinov, and by Professor Luria, both well known. The subjects, while blindfolded, can distinguish colours by finger touch alone. One girl, Rosa Kuleshova, can also, it is claimed, read print with her fingers, even through glass three-quarters of an inch thick. In the United States, the National Institute for Mental Health has made a grant to a professor of psychology, Dr. R. P. Youtz, for research on the subject. He has been working with a Michigan housewife who can distinguish colours by touch alone. The faculty is not affected by electric or magnetic fields, but is temporarily lost when the hands are cold. In Dr. Youtz's experiments with 135 women college students, 20 of them possessed the power in a much slighter degree.

Jules Romains of France claims that all these merely corroborate what he reported upon in the twenties. His book *Eyeless Sight* created quite a sensation, but he states researchers since then have ignored all his findings. He too claims to have trained himself to read print blindfold. Meanwhile in the dovecotes of physiology and psychology scepticism is stirring, and, at the other extreme, doubtless credulity is gaping at the wonder. But some will see in it neither fraud, delusion, nor miracle, but simply the natural psychic powers, latent in man, unfolding in their due cycle. Each such phase brings its own dangers, unless spiritual and moral development precede and control the growth of the psychic faculties, and the use to which they are put. The old fable of the ring of Gyges is equally valid today.